TORTS-BYSTANDER

LIABILITY-UNMARRIED

SATISFY THE "INTIMATE

CoHABrrANTs

FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP"

MAY

ELEMENT OF

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WHERE THEY
HAVE A STABLE, ENDURING, SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
STRONG EMOTIONAL BONDS AND DEEP EMOTIONAL SEcURrIy-

Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 642 A.2d 372 (1994).
Courts have traditionally been reluctant to permit recovery for
emotional harm.' Early cases viewed emotional harm as a "parasitic" damage recoverable only when accompanied by a separate
underlying tort forming the basis for the cause of action.2 Accord1 Howard J. Kaplan, Note, Bystander Recovery: A Policy OrientedApproach, 32 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 877, 877 (1987); Pamela Cogan Thigpen, Comment, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: New Horizons After Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 13 PAC.
LJ. 179, 179, 181 (1981); Darryl Wane Tang, Comment, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals: CaliforniaExpands Liability for Negligently Inflicted EmotionalDistress 33 HASTINGS L.J. 291, 291 (1981); Thomas C. Zaret, Comment, Negligent Infliction ofEmotional
Distress: Reconciling the Bystander andDirect Victim Causes of Action, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 145,
145, (1983). SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 12, at 54-55 (5th ed. 1984) (observing the law's sluggishness in recognizing emotional tranquility as an interest worthy of independent protection, despite the law's
early protection against assault); Julie A. Greenberg, Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: A Proposalfor a Consistent Theory of Tort Recovery for Bystanders and Direct Victims,
19 PEPP. L. REv. 1283, 1283 (1992) (noting the suspicion of courts in regard to emotional distress claims); Michael A. Sitzman, Note, Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric
Medical Clinic, Inc.: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Bounces Out of Bounds, 22
PAC. LJ. 189, 191 (1990) (stating that courts in the past viewed emotional harms as
"simple annoyances and trivialities of life"); Claudia J. Wrazel, Note, Limiting Liability
for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The "BystanderRecovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL.
L. REv. 847, 847 (1981) (noting the reluctance of courts to permit emotional harm to
serve as the basis of a negligence action).
2 KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 12, at 57; Kaplan, supra note 1, at 879; Wrazel,
supranote 1, at 848-49. See, e.g., Anthony v. Norton, 56 P. 529, 531 (Kan. 1899) (stating that a parent may recover for "the wounds to his parental feelings" where an
action for seduction of the parent's daughter is established); Fisher v. Rumler, 214
N.W. 310, 311 (Mich. 1927) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that mental suffering,
endured because of false imprisonment, is a proper element of damage"); Trogden v.
Terry, 90 S.E. 583, 585 (N.C. 1916) (permitting a plaintiffs recovery for mental suffering where the plaintiff established a cause of action for assault); Williams v. Underhill, 71 N.Y.S. 291, 292-93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901) (reversing the trial court's denial
of recovery for mental anguish resulting from an assault, stating that the distinction
between a case which is based upon a willful tort and one which is based upon fright
alone due to negligence is clear).
The first case in New Jersey reflecting this rule was decided in 1890. Buchanan v.
West Jersey R.R., 52 N.J.L. 265, 266, 19 A. 254, 254 (N.J. 1890). In Buchanan, the
plaintiff threw herself to the ground to avoid being hit by timber that protruded from
a train while she stood on the defendant's railroad platform. Id. The court permitted
recovery for fright-induced illness, but declared that the basis for the action arose
from the carelessness of the defendant, which forced the plaintiff to fall to the
ground, not in the fright itself. Id.
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ingly, England developed the "impact rule" in 1888, which imposed, as a prerequisite to recovery for emotional damage, a
requirement that the plaintiff sustain some physical contact as a
result of the defendant's negligence.3 Shortly thereafter, American
courts also formally adopted the impact rule.4
Courts and commentators have enunciated several reasons for
this hostility toward emotional injury claims, 5 including difficulty of
measuring damages, 6 difficulty of establishing proximate cause, 7
and the potential for excessive litigation and fraudulent claims.'
3 See Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 225 (P.C. 1888). In
Coultas, a gate-keeper of the defendant railroad allowed the plaintiffs to drive across
railroad tracks while an oncoming train approached. Id. at 224. After the plaintiffs'
buggy crossed the tracks, the train passed at high speed close to the rear of the buggy.
Id. One of the plaintiffs fainted when she saw the train approaching. Id. The court
held that fright alone, absent some physical injury, cannot be a proximate result of a
defendant's act. Id. at 225. The court also expressed concern that permitting recovery based on fright alone would result in excessive litigation, fraudulent claims, and
recovery of remote damages. Id. at 225-26, 226. See generally Archibald H.
Throckmorton, Damagesfor Fright, 34 HIv. L. Rlv. 260 (1920, 1921) (discussing the
treatment of early emotional distress cases in England and the United States).
4 See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B. R., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897) (holding that recovery for mental distress requires physical injury resulting from impact, not merely from
the mental disturbance); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354, 354 (N.Y. 1896) (denying recovery where horses pulling defendant's carriage ran and stopped so that
plaintiff was standing between two horses, resulting in plaintiff's illness and miscarriage due to fear); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 23 A. 340, 340 (Pa. 1892)
(holding that no cause of action exists where plaintiff suffered distress after train cars
derailed and hit plaintiffs building).
A requirement that there be some physical injury to recover for fright, however,
already informally existed. See Wyman v. Leavitt, 36 Am. Rep. 303, 305 (Me. 1880)
(deciding that a plaintiffs testimony as to fear she suffered due to defendant's negligence was inadmissible because mental suffering without physical injury cannot sustain an action).
NewJersey adopted the impact rule in Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore RR. Ward v.
WestJersey & Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 386, 47 A. 561, 562 (N.J. 1900). See infra
notes 53-60 and accompanying text for further discussion of Ward.
5 See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 12, at 55-57, § 54, at 360-61 (discussing and rejecting the reasons proffered for the reluctance to compensate emotional
harm). See infra note 10 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the rejection of these reasons as invalid.
6 See Mitchell 45 N.E. at 354-55 (expressing the concern that permitting recovery
for fright alone would result in measuring damages based on conjecture or speculation); Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (H.L. 1861) (stating that "[im]ental pain
or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful
act complained of causes that alone").
7 See Mitchell 45 N.E. at 355 (proffering that to allow recovery based on fright
alone would increase the difficulty of deciding whether the negligent act caused the
physical injuries); Victorian Rys. Commrs, 13 App. Cas. at 226 (same).
8 See Spade, 47 N.E. at 89 (admonishing that limitations should be placed on the
right to recover to prevent excessive litigation and unjust claims); Mitchell, 45 N.E. at
354-55 (same); Victorian Rys. Comm'rs, 13 App. Cas. at 226 (same).
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The impact rule proved to be an unworkable method of alleviating
these problems.9 Moreover, most of these reasons are no longer
viewed as sufficient grounds for denying recovery.' 0 Therefore,
9 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 54, at 363-64. The impact rule was at first
thought to provide a means of assuring that the claim was genuine. Id. at 363;
Kaplan, supra note 1, at 879. This rationale lost support, however, because courts
began to find the impact requirement satisfied by slight contacts that sometimes
played no role in causing the injury. KEETON ET AL, supra note 1, § 54, at 363; see, e.g.,
Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 144 S.E. 680, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928) (stating that
"[a]ny unlawful touching of a person's body... constitutes a physical injury to that
person" and permitting recovery for mental harm where a circus horse "evacuated his
bowels" into the plaintiff's lap); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 23 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Ky. 1929) (explaining that recovery for fright may be allowed
where a passenger came into contact with a loose wire from a trolley car, "no matter
how slight the burn"); Driscoll v. Gaffey, 92 N.E. 1010, 1012 (Mass. 1910) (stating that
there may be recovery for shock although the injury sustained is very slight); Homans
v. Boston Elevated Ry., 62 N.E. 737, 737 (Mass. 1902) (concluding that a passenger in
a railroad car who received a "slight blow" due to a collision may recover for mental
shock); Porter v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 406, 63 A. 860,
860 (N.J. 1906) (stating that the required contact would be satisfied if the plaintiff
could prove that dust entered her eyes); Comstock v. Wilson, 177 N.E. 431, 433 (N.Y.
1931) (holding that "where there has been a physical impact, even though slight,
accompanied by shock, there may be a recovery for damages to health caused by the
shock, even though that shock was the result produced by the impact and fright concurrently"); Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869, 869 (Ohio 1930) (concluding that a child
who inhaled smoke during a fire in the building where he lived could recover from
the building's owner for nervousness that the child suffered subsequent to the event);
Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 56 A.2d 89, 91 (Pa. 1948) (concluding that an electric shock is "a substantial physical injury rather than a mere technical battery, even
though no externally visible marks were found"); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351,
354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) (determining that a "jarring and jostling" of the plaintiff
resulting from a car accident was sufficient impact to allow recovery for the plaintiff's
subsequent emotional distress).
10 See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 12, at 55-57, § 54, at 360 (rebutting
each of these objections as insufficient bases for denying recovery). The potential for
excessive litigation has become viewed as an insufficient basis for denying recovery.
TERRENCE F. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY. RECOVERY IN THE '90s, § 3.1, at 110
(1990); Joseph P. Towey, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg
in California and Other States, 25 HASTINGS LJ. 1248, 1250 (1974). See KEETON ET AL.,

supra note 1, § 12, at 56 (asserting that "it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on
the part of any court ofjustice to deny relief on such grounds") (footnote omitted).
The objection that damages are difficult to measure has also become viewed as an
insufficient reason to deny recovery. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 12, at 55 (stating that "mental suffering is scarcely more difficult of proof, and certainly no harder
to estimate in terms of money, than the physical pain of a broken leg, which has never
been denied compensation") (footnote omitted). The objection that proximate
cause is difficult to establish has also been criticized. See id. at 56 (noting that certain
emotional reactions are the normal results of fear of physical injury and that lack of
proximate cause therefore cannot be based upon unforeseeability).
The concern that fraudulent claims would result from permitting recovery based
upon emotional distress has been diminished by the advances in medical science,
which can now produce reliable evidence of causation. 4 STuART M. SPEISER ET AL.,
THE AMERICAN LAw OF TORTS, § 16:26, at 1124 (1987); KIELY, supra, § 3.1, at 110; John
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England 1 and a vast majority of American jurisdictions1" abolished
the impact rule in favor of a test requiring that the plaintiff be
within a foreseeable "zone of danger" to recover for mental distress.1 " Nevertheless, two main concerns continue to require some
limitation on emotional distress actions: the fear of fictitious
claims and the threat of unlimited liability.1 4 Thus, many courts
D. Burley, Case Comment, Dillon Revisited: Toward a Better Paradigmfor Bystander Cases,
43 OHIO ST. LJ. 931, 932 (1982); DavidJ. Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional
Distress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. Fsv. L. 163, 163-64 (1977); Towey,
supra,at 1249. See also AndrewJ. Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between California and New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 12 (1976)
(expressing surprise that physical injury remains a requirement to recover for emotional distress in light of the extensive advances medical science has achieved in identifying and proving emotional harm). Medical science has determined that fear and
other emotional feelings may in themselves constitute physical injuries. KEETON ET
AL., supranote 1, § 12, at 56. Rather than denying recovery, it has been proffered that
the evidence should be scrutinized. Id. These advances in medical science also refute
arguments that proximate cause is difficult to establish in emotional distress cases. See
id.(stating that emotional reactions recognized by medical science as physical injuries
are the normal results of being threatened with physical injury, and that "if they are
held to be beyond the scope of legal cause, the reason must be something other than
unforeseeability") (footnote omitted).
11 See Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 KIB. 669, 673-74 (1901) (stating that impact without physical injury is just as insufficient a ground for recovery as fright alone, and
criticizing the impact rule as unreasonable).
12 See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Colo. 1978) (abolishing the
impact rule and concluding that a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress if he "is
subjected to an unreasonable risk of bodily harm due to the negligence of another");
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 714-15 (Del. 1965) (declining to follow the
impact rule and holding that recovery will be permitted if the plaintiff was "within the
immediate area of physical danger"); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1067 (D.C.
1990) (holding that a plaintiff within the zone of danger may recover for emotional
distress regardless of whether impact occurred); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457
N.E.2d 1, 5 (Mll.
1983) (substituting the zone-of-danger rule for the impact rule); Bass
v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983) (abandoning the impact rule and
stating that recovery will be permitted if the defendant should have foreseen that his
acts entailed "an unreasonable risk of causing the distress" and if the distress is medically diagnosable and medically significant). See infranote 20 (listing cases from those
few states that continue to adhere to the impact rule).
13 See Wrazel, supra note 1, at 849; Burley, supra note 10, at 933; KIELY, supra note
10, at 110-11; Towey, supra note 10, at 1251; see alsoJohn L. Diamond, Dillon v. Legg
Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible
Injuries, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 477, 480-81 (1984); Richard S. Miller, The Scope of Liabilityfor
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U.
HAw. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1979); Keith Ansbacher, Comment, Portee v.Jaffee: Dillon Comes
to New Jersey, 33 RUTGEaS L. REv. 1171, 1172 (1981); W. Scott Blackmer, Note, Molien
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Negligence Actions for EmotionalDistress and Loss of Consortium without PhysicalInjury, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1142, 1151 (1981); Paul V. Calandrella,
Note, Safe Haven for a Troubled Tort: A Return to the Zone of Dangerfor The Negligent
Infliction ofEmotional Distress, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 79, 91 (1992). See infra note 22
for cases from jurisdictions that currently follow the zone-of-danger rule.
14 Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1283-84.
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still require that mental damage be manifested by some physical
5
1

injury.

Over the past several decades, courts have developed a vast
body of law pertaining to a bystander's right to recover for emotional distress as a result of witnessing danger or injury to another
15 See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668, 669 (Ariz. 1979) (stating that a plaintiff's
mental suffering "must be manifested as a physical injury" for the plaintiff to recover
for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Robb, 210 A.2d at 714-15 (holding that a
plaintiff may recover for emotional distress if the distress produces physical consequences); Rickey, 457 N.E.2d at 5 (stating that a bystander must show that the emotional distress resulted in physical injury or illness); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104,
107-08 (Iowa 1981) (stating that physical manifestations of the emotional distress
should usually accompany the distress to allow recovery); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437
N.E.2d 171, 180 (Mass. 1982) (stating that a plaintiff must produce evidence of physical injury to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Stadler v. Cross,
295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1980) (stating that a plaintiff may recover for emotional
distress which results in physical injury) (citation omitted). Contra Molien v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 820 (Cal. 1980) (maintaining that "the unqualified requirement of physical injury is no longer justifiable"); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d
758, 762 (Haw. 1974) (enunciating that "the requirement of resulting physical injury,
like the requirement of physical impact, should not stand as another artificial bar to
recovery, but merely be admissible as evidence of the degree of mental or emotional
distress suffered"); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 443
(Wis. 1994) (concluding that physical manifestation of distress is not an element that
a plaintiff must prove). See also Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970)
(noting that some guarantee of genuineness is required to support an emotional distress claim in cases where the proof of emotional distress is not medically significant
in nature) (citations omitted). See generally 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMINGJAMES, JR.,
THE LAW OF TORTS, § 18.4, at 1031-33 (1956).
The American Law Institute also views physical injury as a prerequisite to recovery for emotional distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND).OF TORTS § 436A (1965). The
RESTATEMENT provides:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of
causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it
results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or
other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional
disturbance.
Id.
Several types of physical manifestations have been alleged in an attempt to satisfy
the requirement, with varying results. See, e.g., Williams, 572 A.2d at 1063, 1069 (stating that the plaintiff claimed that she had trouble eating and sleeping and suffered
from insomnia, stomach problems, diarrhea, and nausea, but concluding that no recovery may be permitted for emotional distress which results from witnessing injury to
another) (citations omitted); Barnhill, 300 N.W.2d at 108 (finding the physical injury
requirement satisfied where the plaintiff alleged that he suffered dizziness, leg pains,
and back pains); Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 362 N.W.2d 137, 140, 144 (Wis. 1985)
(stating that the plaintiff allegedly suffered insomnia, disruption of her family relationship, decreasing school grades, and damage to her self-image, but that these
symptoms were immaterial because she was outside the zone of danger). Some exceptions to the physical injury requirement exist, for example, where negligent transmissions of messages announcing a death causes emotional distress and where corpses
have been negligently mishandled. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 54, at 362.
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person.1" Previously, many courts denied recovery in such situations. 17 Courts justified denying recovery either on the basis that
the defendant did not owe the bystander a duty of care because the
injury to the bystander was unforeseeable," s or because the public
policy concern of imposing unlimited liability on the negligent defendant mandated denial. 9 Although most states no longer apply
the impact rule, a few continue to adhere to it and deny recovery
in bystander situations for lack of physical contact to the
bystander. °
16 See generallyKEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 54, at 365-67 (tracing the law applicable to a plaintiff's right to recover for emotional harm which results from fearing or
witnessing injury to another); SPEISER ET AL., supra note 10, §§ 16:23-16:28, at 1106-46
(same); P. G. Guthrie, Annotation, Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of
Injury to Another, or Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R. 3d 1337
(1970) (same).
17 KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 54, at 365; see, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d
419, 419-20 (N.Y. 1969) (concluding that a plaintiff may not recover for emotional
harm which results from injury to another, "regardless of the relationship and
whether the [plaintiff] was an eyewitness to the incident which resulted in the direct
injuries"); Nuckles v. Tenn. Elec. Power Co., 299 S.W. 775, 775-76 (Tenn. 1927) (denying recovery to a mother who witnessed her child injured by a street car, stating that
recovery is not permitted for mental distress resulting from witnessing injury to another); McMahon v. Bergeson, 101 N.W.2d 63, 71 (Wis. 1960) (stating that recovery
would be denied where the plaintiffs neurosis was the result of witnessing another
lying in the street after an accident, unless the tortfeasor knew of the plaintiffs susceptibility to emotional distress) (citations omitted).
18 KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 54, at 365 (citing Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879,
879, 883 (Md. 1952) (concluding that the mother of two children who were hit by a
car could not recover for emotional distress suffered from witnessing the accident);
Cote v. Litawa, 71 A.2d 792, 793, 794-95 (N.H. 1950) (determining that a defendant
who hit a child with his car owed no duty to the child's mother to protect her from
emotional distress suffered after learning of the injury because "[siuch consequences
are ... an unusual and extraordinary result of the careless operation of an automobile"); Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis. 1935) (concluding that a defendant owes no duty to those persons who suffer distress from witnessing injury to
another but are outside a zone of danger because "[s]uch consequences are so unusual and extraordinary")).
19 See Tobin, 249 N.E.2d at 423 ("The problem of unlimited liability is suggested by
the unforeseeable consequence of extending recovery for harm to others than those
directly involved in the accident."); Resavage, 86 A.2d at 883 (stating that allowing
bystanders to recover for distress suffered from witnessing injury to another "would
involve a tremendous extension of liability to the world at large").
20 See, e.g., Reynolds v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 1294, 1297
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that the impact rule barred the plaintiffs recovery for emotional distress which resulted from witnessing the death of her boyfriend in a car accident); OB-GYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146, 148
(Ga. 1989) (stating that Georgia adheres to the impact requirement and requires
contact as a result of the tortfeasor's conduct in order to recover for mental distress);
Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ind. 1991) (articulating that a plaintiff
may recover for mental distress where the "plaintiff sustains a direct impact by the
negligence of another"); Gorman v. I & M Elec. Co., Inc., 641 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (Ind.
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Today, courts are more liberal in allowing bystanders to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.2 1 At least thirteen jurisdictions currently follow the zone-of-danger rule when
determining whether recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress is warranted.2 2 Under the zone-of-danger rule, a plaintiff
Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to abolish the impact rule and adopt the zone-of-danger
rule); Anderson v. Scheffler, 752 P.2d 667, 669 (Kan. 1988) ("There may be no recovery in Kansas for emotional distress unless that distress results in 'physical impact': an
actual physical injury to the plaintiff."); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 145-46 (Ky.
1980) (stating that an action for emotional distress will not lie if the distress is not
accompanied by impact); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 816 P.2d
593, 598 (Ore. 1991) (declining to abolish the impact rule, stating that "[t]his court
will not lightly overturn precedent, especially when the precedent has been followed
for a long time").
21 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 10, § 16:23, at 1109; see generally KEETON ET AL., supra
note 1, § 54, at 365-67 (tracing the law applicable to a plaintiff's right to recover for
emotional harm which results from fearing or witnessing injury to another).
22 See Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668, 669, 670 (Ariz. 1979) (adopting the zone-ofdanger rule and concluding that a plaintiff who witnessed injury to her mother in a
car accident may recover for emotional distress which resulted in physical injury);
Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164, 1165 (Colo. 1978) (finding that a child who
witnessed an explosion in his house while he stood on a porch outside the house
could recover for distress suffered as a result of being subjected to a risk of harm);
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 710, 714-15 (Del. 1965) (adopting the zoneof-danger rule and reversing summary judgment for the defendant where the plaintiff's car became lodged in a rut at a railroad crossing and the plaintiff barely escaped
before the train collided with the car); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064, 1069,
1073 (D.C. 1990) (holding that a claimant must be within a zone of danger and fear
for her own safety to recover for mental harm that results from witnessing injury to an
immediate family member, and denying recovery to a mother who witnessed physical
suffering of her son but was not endangered herself); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (IIl. 1983) (adopting the zone-of-danger rule and concluding that a
plaintiff who witnessed injury to his brother may amend his pleading so the court can
determine whether the plaintiff was within the zone of danger and feared for his own
safety); Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879, 883 (Md. 1952) (concluding that a mother
could not recover for emotional distress that resulted from seeing her two children
killed by a car, reasoning that the mother herself was not in danger); Stadler v. Cross,
295 N.W.2d 552, 553-54, 555 (Minn. 1980) (determining that parents who saw their
child hit by a car could not recover for emotional distress where the parents were not
within the zone of danger) (citations omitted); Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial
Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595, 596, 599-600 (Mo. 1990) (concluding that a plaintiff must be
within the zone of danger to recover for distress that results from witnessing injury to
a third person, and denying recovery to a mother who witnessed the suffering of her
son as a result of medical malpractice, reasoning that she faced no personal peril);
Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 844, 848, 850 (N.Y. 1984) (adopting the zone-ofdanger rule and permitting recovery for emotional distress suffered by the plaintiffs as
a result of witnessing an immediate family member injured in a car accident, where
the plaintiffs were also in the car at the time of the accident); Whetham v. Bismarck
Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972) (denying recovery to a mother for emotional
distress that resulted from witnessing a hospital employee drop the mother's baby,
stating that recovery could only be permitted if the mother had been placed within
the zone of danger); Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861, 866
(Tenn. 1978) (concluding that a father could not recover for emotional distress suf-
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within an area that holds the potential for personal injury arising
from the defendant's negligence may recover for fear of his own
safety.2 3 Many courts extended this rule to permit a bystander
within the zone of danger and fearful for his own safety to recover
for emotional distress resulting from witnessing harm to another. 4
fered after learning of his child's injury in a car accident because he was not within
the zone of danger and did not witness the accident); Boucher v. Dixie Medical Ctr.,
850 P.2d 1179, 1180, 1182 (Utah 1992) (finding that parents could not recover for
emotional distress suffered after their child became brain-damaged due to negligent
medical treatment because the parents were not within the zone of danger); Jobin v.
McQuillen, 609 A.2d 990, 991, 993 (Vt. 1992) (concluding that a mother could not
recover for distress suffered after learning that the medical examiner retained her
deceased son's brain where the mother did not claim that she feared for her own
safety).
23 Kaplan, supra note 1, at 885. The basis for permitting recovery for fear of injury
to oneself under the zone-of-danger rule is that the plaintiff's close proximity to the
negligent act renders the harm reasonably foreseeable. Id.
The American Law Institute has also adopted the zone-of-danger rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 313, 436 (1965). Specifically, RESTATEMENT § 313
provides:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he
is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily harm if
the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable
risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or
peril of a third person, and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized that the distress,
if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to illness or
bodily harm of another which is caused by emotional distress arising
solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the
actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the
other.
Id., § 313. RESTATEMENT § 436 provides:

(1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care
designed to protect another from a fright or other emotional disturbance which the actor should recognize as involving an unreasonable
risk of bodily harm, the fact that the harm results solely through the
internal operation of the fright or other emotional disturbance does
not protect the actor from liability.
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk
of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to
fright, shock, or other similar and immediate emotional disturbance,
the fact that such harm results solely from the internal operation of
fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from
liability.
(3) The rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to
the other results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member
of his immediate family occurring in his presence.
Id., § 436.
24 See, e.g., Keck, 593 P.2d at 669 (concluding that recovery will be permitted for
emotional distress that results from witnessing harm to a third party if an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff existed and if the plaintiff suffered physical injury);
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If the bystander is not within the zone of danger, however, courts
following the zone-of-danger rule continue to deny recovery for
emotional distress caused by witnessing harm to a third person. 5
In addition to being within the zone of danger, bystander recovery
also depends upon two prerequisites: the bystander must suffer
physical harm as a result
of the distress2 6 and must be closely re7
victim.
lated to the
Williams, 572 A.2d at 1064, 1069 (deciding that recovery may be permitted for mental
distress that results from witnessing harm to a family member where the plaintiff was
within the zone of danger and feared for his own safety); Rickey, 457 N.E.2d at 5
(adopting the zone-of-danger rule and concluding that a plaintiff who witnessed injury to his brother may amend his pleading so the court can determine whether the
plaintiff was within the zone of danger and feared for his own safety) (citations omitted); Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 596, 599-600 (concluding that a plaintiff must be within the
zone of danger to recover for distress that results from witnessing injury to a third
person, and denying recovery to a mother who witnessed the suffering of her son as a
result of medical malpractice, reasoning that she faced no personal peril); Bovsun,
461 N.E.2d at 848, 850 (adopting the zone-of-danger rule and permitting recovery for
emotional distress suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of witnessing an immediate
family member injured in a car accident, where the plaintiffs were also in the car at
the time of the accident); Whetham, 197 N.W.2d at 684 (denying recovery to a mother
for emotional distress that resulted from witnessing a hospital employee drop the
mother's baby, stating that recovery could only be permitted if the mother had been
placed within the zone of danger).
The rationale behind allowing recovery in bystander situations is that once it is
established that the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff by engaging in a
negligent act, the foreseeability of the actual harm to the bystander becomes irrelevant, and the defendant should be responsible for any damage which directly flowed
from the negligent act. Hambrook v,Stokes Bros., 1 K.B. 141, 156, 157 (1924); Wilhams, 572 A.2d at 1069 ("Having breached a duty of care to the plaintiff, the negligent
tortfeasor should be held liable for all resultant damages."); Bovsun, 461 N.E.2d at 847
(emphasizing that "by unreasonably endangering the plaintiffs physical safety the defendant has breached a duty owed to him or her for which he or she should recover
all damages sustained").
25 See, e.g., lacona v. Schrupp, 521 N.W.2d 70, 71, 72, 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
(denying recovery for the plaintiffs distress that resulted from seeing a close friend
get run over by a truck, reasoning that the plaintiff was not within the zone of danger); Zea v. Kolb, 613 N.Y.S.2d 88, 88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (concluding that a
mother could not recover for distress suffered after witnessing her child struck by a
car because the mother was not within the zone of danger) (citations omitted).
26 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the physical injury
requirement).
27 See, e.g., Keck, 593 P.2d at 670 (stating that the mental injury must be the result
of witnessing harm to someone "with whom the plaintiff has a close personal relationship, either by consanguinity or otherwise") (citation omitted); Williams, 572 A.2d at
1064 (concluding that a plaintiff who is within the zone of danger and fears for his
own safety may recover for mental harm suffered as a result of "witnessing injury to an
immediate family member"); Bovsun, 461 N.E.2d at 848 (holding that a plaintiff may
recover for emotional distress due to witnessing "the serious injury or death of a member of his or her immediate family"). The American Law Institute similarly requires
the victim to be a member of the plaintiffs immediate family. See supra note 23,
setting forth the language of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(3) (1965),
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Practitioners have discerned several problems with the zoneof-danger rule.2 8 For example, both courts and commentators consider the rule arbitrary because it bars recovery even if the plaintiff
suffered harm but did not encounter physical danger. 9 Furtherwhich adopts the requirement that the plaintiffs physical harm result from mental
distress due to witnessing injury or danger to an immediate family member occurring
in his presence.
28 See Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 442 (Wis.
1994) (declaring that the zone-of-danger rule produces arbitrary results and, thus,
joining the growing number of states rejecting the zone-of-danger rule).
In Bowen, the defendant negligently hit a teenager with his automobile while the
teen was riding his bicycle. Id. at 435. Although the victim's mother did not witness
the accident, she arrived at the accident scene minutes later and watched others attempt to rescue her son, who was trapped under the car. Id. Shortly after the accident, the child died in a hospital. Id. The mother sought recovery for the emotional
distress resulting from the incident. Id.
Justice Abrahamson, writing for the majority, stated that although the zone-ofdanger test appeared to have quieted Wisconsin's fear of trivial and fictitious claims
and the danger of unlimited liability, rigid application of the doctrine often denied
recovery in cases where the plaintiff deserves compensation. Id. at 434, 442. The
justice proclaimed that the zone-of-danger rule also produces arbitrary results by affording different treatment for similarly-situated plaintiffs. Id.; see also Kaplan, supra
note 1, at 887-88 (enunciating the flaws of the zone-of-danger test).
The Bowen court held that a bystander's emotional distress claim should be evaluated under traditional elements of a negligence action. 517 N.W.2d at 442-43 (footnote omitted). The court enunciated these elements as "negligent conduct,
causation, and injury (here severe emotional distress)." Id. at 442-43 (footnote omitted). The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that, coupled with public policy limitations, these elements provide a framework that is preferable to the zone-of-danger
rule. Id. at 443. The court further concluded that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to
show that the distress caused physical injury. Id. The court enunciated four reasons
for relieving the plaintiff of the burden to prove physical manifestation of the distress.
Id. First, Justice Abrahamson observed that the requirement results in prohibiting
recovery absent physical injury despite the fact that severe distress was suffered. Id.
Second, the justice stated that, due to advances in medical science, alternative methods of proving distress exist. Id. Third, the court proffered that the "requirement has
encouraged extravagant pleading, distorted testimony, and meaningless distinctions
between physical and emotional symptoms." Id. Fourth, the court observed that elimination of the requirement in other states has not resulted in a deluge of claims. Id.
The majority consequently overruled Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497 (Wis.
1935), which adopted the zone-of-danger rule. Id. at 436 (stating that the zone-ofdanger rule had, in effect, already been abandoned in Garrett v. City of New Berlin,
362 N.W.2d 137 (1985), but that the court was now formally forsaking it) (other citations omitted).
29 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Flynn, Note, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 788, 794 (1994) (stating that the zone-of-danger rule is "as arbitrary as the physical impact rule") (footnote
omitted); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 915 (Cal. 1968) (observing that the zone-ofdanger rule would allow recovery to one bystander but not another merely because
the former stood a short distance closer to the accident). For a detailed discussion of
arbitrariness in this area of the law and support for the zone-of-danger test as the
preferable rule, see generally Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystandersfor Negligently
Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitray Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REv.
477 (1982).
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more, the test may be outdated due to the abolition of the impact
rule." ° Therefore, in 1968, an alternative approach to bystander
recovery arose that permitted bystanders to recover even though
they may not have been within the zone of danger.3 ' Three guidelines were developed to determine whether a plaintiff's shock-induced physical injury was reasonably foreseeable and therefore
recoverable as a breach of a duty of care: whether the plaintiff was
near the accident, whether the emotional distress arose due to a
sensory and contemporaneous observation, and whether a close re32
lationship existed between the plaintiff and victim.
See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 915. The court stated that:
to rest upon the zone-of-danger rule when we have rejected the impact
rule becomes even less defensible. . . . The zone-of-danger concept
must . . . inevitably collapse because the only reason for the requirement of presence in that zone lies in the fact that one within it will fear
the danger of impact.
Id.; Flynn, supra note 29, at 794 & nn. 20-22 (noting that the zone-of-danger rule
requires a bystander to be within the zone of danger because the bystander would fear
impact only if within close proximity to the negligent occurrence). Therefore, the
zone-of-danger rule is as antiquated as the impact rule in that it determines liability
based upon arbitrary notions of proximity. Id.
31 See DillOn, 441 P.2d at 920 (setting forth three guidelines for determining
whether bystander recovery is warranted). This expansion would later prove to be
vital in influencing New Jersey's expansion of emotional distress recovery. See infra
notes 76-87 and accompanying text (discussing Portee v. Jaffee, 84 NJ. 88, 417 A.2d
521 (1980), which adopted a guideline approach similar to the one set forth in
Dillon).
32 Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920. In Dillon, the defendant negligently struck and killed an
infant with his automobile as the plaintiffs, the child's mother and sister, watched. Id.
at 914. The plaintiffs alleged that they suffered physical injury due to the emotional
distress and shock of witnessing the event. Id. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the mother's claim, but denied
the motion as to the sister's claim. Id. at 915. The trial court found the mother to be
outside the zone of danger, but recognized the possibility that the sister may have
been within the zone of danger because she stood a short distance closer to the accident. Id.
Justice Tobriner, writing for the majority, rejected the zone-of-danger test and
reversed the dismissal of the mother's claim. Id. at 914, 915, 925. The justice expounded that the test was artificial because it would permit the sister's recovery and
deny the mother's merely on the basis that the sister stood a short distance closer to
the accident. Id. at 915. Furthermore, the court stipulated that the test was outdated
due to the abolition of the impact rule. Id. The court discerned that the rationale for
requiring a plaintiff to be within the zone of danger was that the plaintiff would fear
impact. Id.
The court rejected the argument that recovery should be denied due to danger
of fraudulent claims. Id. at 917. First, the court proclaimed that shock will result in
physical injury where a mother witnesses the death of her child. Id. at 917 (quotation
omitted). The majority noted that it had previously recognized the causal connection
between fear and physical suffering. Id. (quotation omitted). Second, the court stipulated that the potential for fraud in some cases in a certain class does not justify
denying recovery to all claims in the class. Id. at 917-18. Thejustice stressed that tort
30
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Recently, in Dunphy v. Gregor,"3 the NewJersey Supreme Court
utilized traditional tort law principles to develop a standard for determining whether a party has satisfied the intimate familial relationship element of New Jersey's guideline approach to negligent
infliction of emotional distress.3 4 Specifically, the court confronted the issue of whether such a relationship may exist between
law imposes liability on a defendant for injuries which are reasonably foreseeable. Id.
at 919. The court determined that the requirement of reasonable foreseeability
would sufficiently limit liability and, therefore, rejected the argument that recovery
should be denied for danger of infinite liability. Id. Accordingly, the court developed
the three guidelines to utilize in determining whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable and, consequently, recoverable. Id. at 920.
The court therefore overruled Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d
513, 514 (Cal. 1963) (rejecting the notion of permitting recovery for emotional distress caused by fear of injury to another). Id. at 925. The justice elucidated that the
three factors determine the degree of foreseeability. Id. at 920-21. The court noted,
however, that these factors are fact sensitive and that liability will therefore depend
upon the facts of each case. Id. at 921. The court further stipulated that whether the
injury was reasonably foreseeable depends upon whether the ordinary man, not the
defendant, would have foreseen it under the circumstances. Id. Applying the factors
to Dillon, Justice Tobriner found that all three factors were present and that the
mother therefore alleged a prima facie case. Id. The justice stressed the foreseeability of a mother's emotional distress upon witnessing her child's death. Id. (quotations
omitted).
Justice Tobriner left the task of limiting what constitutes "reasonable foreseeability" to future cases where the three factors are not as clearly met. Id. The justice
expressed his confidence in the courts' ability to adequately deal with this task, pointing to other categories of cases which have done so and avoided unlimited liability.
Id. at 921. The court noted that the threat of unlimited liability did not deter England from permitting recovery for emotional harm upon witnessing another's injury.
Id. at 922-23 (citing Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., 1 KB. 141, 157 (1925) (stating that no
distinction should be made between a bystander who fears for her own safety and one
who fears for the safety of a third person); Chadwick v. British Rys. Bd., 1 W.L.R. 912,
919-20 (Q.B. 1967) (stating that no objection exists to allowing recovery for shock
resulting from fear of harm to another, and that foreseeability of injury caused by
shock is the test for liability)). Therefore, the court proffered that general tort law
rules should govern cases such as the one at bar. Id. at 924. The justice explained
that artificiality has led to abandonment of an outright denial of recovery for emotional distress as well as the impact rule. Id. at 924-25.
Justice Burke dissented, stressing that no American jurisdiction has attempted
such an expansion of emotional distress law. Id. at 925-26 (Burke, J., dissenting). The
justice proffered that the majority's guidelines are insufficient to guide future decisions. Id. at 926 (Burke, J., dissenting). The dissent arguedthat the zone-of-danger
test should be followed. Id. at 927 (Burke, J., dissenting).
33 136 N.J. 99, 642 A.2d 372 (1994).
34 Id. at 109, 115, 642 A.2d at 376, 380. New Jersey had previously adopted the
intimate familial relationship requirement in Portee v. Jaffee. Id. at 103, 642 A.2d at
374; see Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 98-99, 417 A.2d 521, 527 (1980) (adopting the
familial relationship requirement as "an essential element of a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress"); see also infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text (discussing Pottee).
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affianced cohabitants.3 5 The court held that an intimate familial
relationship may exist between unmarried cohabitants where the
36
relationship is substantial, stable, and enduring.
On September 29, 1990, a car driven by James Gregor struck
Michael T. Burwell as he helped a friend change an automobile
tire on the shoulder of Interstate 80.37 Eileen Dunphy, Burwell's
fiancee and cohabitant for over two years, 8 witnessed the event
and ran to Burwell's aid.39 Burwell died the next day.4 As a result,
Dunphy suffered from depression and anxiety and subsequently
underwent psychological treatment."
Dunphy filed suit against Gregor to recover for the emotional
distress that resulted from witnessing the accident.4 2 The trial
court granted Gregor's motion for summary judgment,4 3 holding
that Dunphy could not bring an action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress because she was not married to Burwell, nor did
she and Burwell share an intimate familial relationship.4 4
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
reversed, holding that the determination of whether the required
interpersonal bonds exist between affianced cohabitants constitutes an issue for the jury.4 5 The court concluded that the law
should protect emotional stability against unreasonable conduct,'
35 Dunphy, 136 N.J. at 101, 642 A.2d at 373.
36 Id. at 115, 642 A.2d at 380.
37 Id. at 102, 642 A.2d at 373. The car dragged or propelled Burwell's body 240
feet. Id.
38 Id. Dunphy and Burwell had already set a marriage date, and they shared ajoint
bank account, jointly purchased a car, and were beneficiaries of each others' life insurance policies. Id. Burwell would introduce Dunphy as his wife in public, and he
often requested that she elope with him. Id.
39 Id. Dunphy tried to comfort Burwell by talking to him as she cleared blood
from his mouth and attempted to control his thrashing hands and feet. Id.
40 Id. Dunphy spent the night at the hospital, after which she was informed of
Burwell's death. Id.
41 Id.
Id.

42

43 See Dunphy v. Gregor, 261 N.J. Super. 110, 114, 617 A.2d 1248, 1250 (App. Div.
1992) (relating the trial court's unreported opinion dismissing the action), affid, 136
N.J. 99, 642 A.2d 372 (1994).
44 Dunphy, 136 N.J. at 101, 642 A.2d at 373.
45 Dunphy, 261 N.J. Super. at 122, 124, 617 A.2d at 1254, 1255. Accordingly, the
court remanded the case to give the jury the opportunity to determine whether an
intimate familial relationship existed. Id.
46 Id. at 117, 617 A.2d at 1251 (quoting Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 101, 417 A.2d
521, 521 (1980)). The court noted the foreseeability of emotional harm that results
from witnessing an event which seriously injures or kills a loved one, observing that
"few persons travel through life alone." Id. (quoting Portee, 84 NJ. at 101, 417 A.2d at
521). The court balanced the interest in emotional security with the interest in avoiding a burden on the freedom of conduct, and found that the former outweighed the
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and further recognized the importance of a relationship characterized by deep emotional commitment and functionally equivalent
to a familial relationship.4 7 The appellate division concluded that
the quality of the relationship must be the focus rather than the
label the relationship bears.4"
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case as a matter of right4 9 and affirmed the appellate division's judgment.5" Relying on general tort principles of foreseeability and fairness, the
latter. Id. (quotation omitted). The issue of unlimited liability did not concern the
appellate division, which took the view that the intimate emotional bonds requirement sufficiently limited recovery. Id., 617 A.2d at 1251-52 (quotation omitted).
47 Id. at 123-24, 617 A.2d at 1255. The court stipulated that the existence of such
a deep emotional attachment should not be ignored by the law. Id.
48 Id. at 117, 617 A.2d at 1252. The court stated:
To foreclose such a plaintiff from making a claim based upon emotional
harm because her relationship with the injured person does not carry a
particular label is to work a potential injustice, not only in this case but
also in too many other instances in which the events leading to the injury or death are indelibly stunning, and where the emotional injury is
genuine and substantial and is based upon a relationship of significant
duration that, at the time of injury, is deep, lasting and genuinely intimate. Important considerations... should include whether the plaintiff and the injured person were members of the same household, their
emotional reliance on each other, the particulars of their day to day
relationship, and the manner in which they related to each other in
attending to life's mundane requirements.
Id. at 123, 617 A.2d at 1254-55. The court noted, however, that regardless of the
relationship, the defendant has the right to test the factual basis of the claim. Id. at
122, 617 A.2d at 1254.
49 Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 102, 642 A.2d 372, 373 (1994). Judge Muir,
dissenting from the appellate division, argued that either legal marriage or blood
relation is a prerequisite to the cause of action and that the law in this area should not
be expanded. Dunphy, 261 NJ. Super. at 124, 617 A.2d at 1255 (Muir, JA.D., dissenting) (citing Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980)); see infra notes 77-88 and
accompanying text for a further discussion of Portee. The dissent posited that only the
supreme court, not the appellate division, could extend the cause of action beyond
marriage or blood ties. Dunphy, 261 NJ. at 125, 617 A.2d at 1255 (Muir, JA.D., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that California has declined to make a similar extension allowing an unmarried cohabitant to recover. Id., 617 A.2d at 1256 (Muir,
JA.D., dissenting) (citing Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988)). The dissent
noted that the Elden court's reasons for denying recovery to an unmarried cohabitant
included an interest in promoting marriage, eliminating common law marriages,
problems for the courts as a result of expansion, and concerns of unlimited liability.
Id.
50 Dunphy, 136 N.J. at 115, 642 A.2d at 380. The court observed that New Jersey,
unlike California, has been conservative in its application of the elements of a bystander's cause of action. Id. at 106, 642 A.2d at 375. The court recognized that New
Jersey has applied the elements restrictively, thereby avoiding any radical expansion
of bystander liability. Id. at 106, 108, 642 A.2d 375, 376. Therefore, the court rejected
the holding of Elden, concluding that Elden constituted California's reaction to that
state's liberal expansion of bystander liability after Dillon. See id. at 105-106, 642 A.2d
375 ("Our own experience does not parallel that of California").
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court held that affianced cohabitants may share an intimate famil-

ial relationship where that relationship is deep, enduring, and intimate.5 1 The court concluded that the existence of such a

relationship may be established by the presence of strong emotional bonds and deep emotional security, as determined by a factspecific standard
for identifying and defining the quality of a
52
relationship.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the New Jersey
Supreme Court adopted the impact rule in Ward v. West Jersey &
Seashore R.R"

In Ward, the defendant railroad, without warning of

the danger, allowed the plaintiff to drive upon the defendant's
tracks at a public crossing as a train approached. 4 The defendant
lowered the gates while the plaintiff was still on the tracks, subject-

ing the plaintiff to the danger of being killed by an approaching
train.5 5 The plaintiff alleged that the event caused him to be
"shocked, paralyzed and otherwise injured." 56

Justice Gummere, writing for the court, first noted the universal acceptance of the physical injury requirement, stating that fear
not resulting in physical suffering is not actionable. 7 The justice
acknowledged, however, that where physical injury results from
fear, the authority was divided as to whether an actionable claim
exists.58 The court decided to follow those cases denying recovery
absent physical impact.5 9 Granting the defendantjudgment on the
Id. at 108, 115, 642 A.2d at 376, 380.
Id. at 111-12, 642 A.2d at 377-78. Although the court expressed its confidence
in a jury's ability to assess the quality of a relationship, it acknowledged that a jury
must be guided by a standard in making this determination. Id. at 112, 642 A.2d at
378.
53 65 N.J.L. 383, 384, 47 A. 561, 561 (N.J. 1900). Specifically, the Ward court
adopted the view that where a plaintiff fears physical injuries but does not actually
receive them, recovery should be denied for physical consequences which result from
that fear. Id.
54 Id. at 383, 47 A. at 561.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 384, 47 A. at 561.
51
52

58 Id.
59 Id. at 384-85, 47 A. at 562 (citing Wyman v. Leavitt, 36 Am. Rep. 303, 305 (Me.
1880) (deciding that a plaintiff's testimony as to fear she suffered due to the negligence of the defendant was inadmissible because mental suffering without physical
injury cannot sustain an action); Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass.
1897) (holding that recovery for mental distress requires physical injury resulting
from impact, not merely from the mental disturbance); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45
N.E. 354, 354 (N.Y. 1896) (denying recovery where horses pulling defendant's carriage ran and stopped so that plaintiff was standing between two horses, resulting in
plaintiffs illness and miscarriage due to fear); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry.,
23 A. 340, 340 (Pa. 1892) (holding that no cause of action exists where plaintiff suf-
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demurrer, the court held that fear of personal injuries not actually
received cannot support a negligence action, regardless of whether
physical injury results from fear.6 °
For sixty-five years following Ward, New Jersey courts adhered
to the impact rule but repeatedly permitted recovery in cases involving only slight physical contact.6 1 Not until Falzone v. Busch,62
fered distress after train cars derailed and hit plaintiff's building); Victorian Rys.
Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 225 (P.C. 1888) (holding that fright alone
absent some physical injury cannot be a proximate result of a defendant's act)).
The court offered three reasons for denying recovery for injuries absent physical
impact. Id. at 385-86, 47 A. at 562. First, Justice Gummere articulated that, where a
person of average physical and mental strength is involved, physical injury is not the
natural and proximate result of the fright caused by the negligent act. Id. at 385, 47
A. at 562. Second, the justice determined that, because this constituted a case of first
impression in New Jersey despite the vast amount of lawsuits, the state bar must have
intended that no liability should exist without impact. Id. at 385-86, 47 A. at 562.
Finally, the court stated that public policy reasons support the holding that recovery
be denied. Id. at 386, 47 A. at 562 (quoting Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354-55
(N.Y. 1896) (expressing concerns that permitting recovery would result in excessive
litigation, fraudulent claims, and conjecture and speculation in determining damages)). Id.
60 Id. at 384, 386, 47 A. at 561, 562.
61 See, e.g., Greenberg v. Stanley, 51 NJ. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (App. Div. 1958),
modified on other grounds, 30 NJ. 485, 153 A.2d 833 (1959); Smith v. Montclair Brown
& White Cab Co., 6 NJ. Misc. 57, 139 A. 904 (NJ. 1928); Kennell v. Gershonovitz
Bros., 84 N.J.L. 577, 87 A. 130 (N.J. 1913); Porter v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western
R.R., 73 NJ.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (N.J. 1906); Tuttle v. Atlantic City LR., 66 N.J.L. 327, 49
A. 450 (NJ. 1901).
In Tuttle, a railroad car derailed and traveled at full speed toward the sidewalk
where the plaintiff stood. Tuttle, 66 N.J.L. at 328, 49 A. at 450. Frightened, the plaintiff ran, fell, and injured her knee. Id. The court determined that this was not a case
of mere fright absent physical injury, but that the knee injury satisfied the impact
requirement. Id. at 331, 332, 49 A. at 451. The court declared that where a plaintiff is
placed in reasonable fear of injury because of the defendant's negligence, and the
plaintiff sustains injury in trying to escape, the plaintiff may recover for both the physical and mental harm. Id. at 332, 49 A. at 451.
Five years later, in Porter,the defendant's railroad bridge fell just as the plaintiff
passed from under it. Porter,73 N.J.L. at 406, 63 A. at 860. The plaintiff alleged that
she sustained physical injuries from the shock of the event, that something hit the
back of her neck, and that dust went into her eyes. Id. Allowing recovery, the court
held that either the contact with the plaintiffs neck or the dust which entered her
eyes constituted sufficient impact to satisfy the impact requirement. Id.
The next case allowing recovery, Kennell v. Gershonovitz Bros., arose as the plaintiff
rode in a public street car, in the opposite direction from the defendant's wagon.
Kennell, 84 N.J.L. at 577-78, 87 A. at 130. Just before the car and wagon were to pass
one another, the wagon turned and a protruding object hit the glass of the car. Id.
The plaintiff alleged that she was hit by something and that glass fell on her. Id. at
579, 87 A. at 130. She also suffered a bruise and sprained arm. Id. The court held
that the bruises alone satisfied the impact requirement. Id. at 579, 87 A. at 130-31
(citations omitted).
In Smith v. MontclairBrown & White Cab Co., the defendant struck the car in which
the plaintiff rode. 6 N.J. Misc. 57, 58, 139 A. 904, 905 (N.J. 1928). The plaintiff suf-
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however, did the New Jersey Supreme Court abandon the impact
rule. 63 In Falzone, the plaintiff, seated in a parked car, became ill
due to the fear for her own safety she experienced when the defendant negligently veered his car toward, and nearly collided with,
plaintiff's vehicle.'
Justice Proctor, writing for a unanimous court, rejected as unsound the Ward court's reasons for the adoption of the impact
rule. 65 The justice also recognized a widespread condemnation of
fered nervousness and shock, but conceded that she sustained no physical impact. Id.
at 59, 139 A. at 905. The Supreme Court of New Jersey nonetheless held for the
plaintiff, because the impact issue was not raised at trial. Id. at 60, 139 A. at 905.
Finally, in Greenbergv. Stanley, the appellate division restated the impact rule. 51
N.J. Super. at 106, 143 A.2d at 597. Specifically, the Greenbergcourt stated that:
As NewJersey does not allow a cause of action for mental anguish where
there has been no physical impact upon the plaintiff, even where his
fear is for his own safety . . . the infliction of anguish by the negligent
injury of another, without physical trauma to the plaintiff, would be
equally irremediable. But where the defendant's negligence occasions
some personal physical injury to the plaintiff, no matter how slight, the
plaintiff may recover for fright, shock and mental agitation as part of his
damages.
Id. (citations omitted).
62 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).
63 See id. at 569, 214 A.2d at 17 ("Our conclusion is that Ward should no longer be
followed in New Jersey.").
64 Id. at 561, 214 A.2d at 13. Before veering toward the plaintiff, the defendant
first negligently struck the plaintiff's husband with his car while her husband stood in
an adjacent field. Id. The plaintiff based the complaint, however, on the fear she
suffered for her own safety, and did not allege that she feared for her husband. Id.
65 Id. at 563, 214 A.2d at 14; see supra note 59 (examining Ward's reasons for requiring physical impact as a prerequisite to recovery). Addressing Wards first reason, the
justice proffered that medical evidence should determine the causal link between
fright and physical injury. Falzone, 45 N.J. at 563-64, 214 A.2d at 14-15 (citations and
quotations omitted). The court noted an expansion of medical evidence establishing
a connection between mental distress and physical injury. Id. at 564, 214 A.2d at 1415 (citations omitted). The court further undermined Wards view that fright cannot
proximately cause injury in an average person by enunciating three contrary rules
which had developed in New Jersey. Id. at 564-65, 214 A.2d at 15. First, the court
observed that recovery for fright-induced physical consequences has been permitted
where a person suffered even a slight injury in an attempt to avoid another's negligently-created danger, even if such injury did not contribute to the cause of the frightinduced consequences. Id. Second, the justice stipulated that recovery has been allowed where there is even an inconsequential or slight impact. Id. at 565, 214 A.2d at
15 (citations omitted); see supranote 61 (discussing post-Ward cases that have allowed
recovery based on impact). Third, the court noted that, where emotional disturbance
was willfully caused, recovery has been allowed for resulting physical injury. Fahone,
45 N.J. at 565, 214 A.2d at 15 (citations omitted).
Turning to Wards second reason for denying recovery, Justice Proctor refused to
believe that the Ward court intended to imply that lawyers' opinions on the issue
served as the basis for its denying recovery. Id. The justice further stipulated that lack
of precedent allowing recovery without impact would not bar the action, discerning
that "the common law would have atrophied hundreds of years ago if it had contin-
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the impact rule.6 6 Consequently, the court held that a plaintiff
may recover for substantial bodily injury or sickness resulting from
"a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury" where recovery
would be permitted
had the injury or sickness resulted from direct
67
physical injury.

In Caputzal v. Lindsay Co.,68 the New Jersey Supreme Court
qualified the Falzone holding by stressing the dual requirements of
duty and foreseeable injury.69 In Caputzal, the plaintiff, after seeing discolored water flow from his bathroom faucet, suffered a
heart attack from fear that he may have been poisoned as a result
of using that water to make his coffee. 70 He sought recovery from
ued to deny relief in cases of first impression." Id. at 565-66, 214 A.2d at 15 (citation
omitted).
The court then turned to Ward's public policy reasons for denying recovery. Id.
at 566, 214 A.2d at 15. Justice Proctor first addressed Wards concern that if recovery
were permitted absent impact, conjecture and speculation would be the basis for recovery due to difficulty in proving causation between fear and physical injury, resulting in fictitious claims. Id. The justice conceded that difficulties of proof exist, but
noted that such difficulties exist in all personal injury cases. Id. (citations omitted).
Therefore, the court elucidated that reliance must be placed on "the quality and genuineness of proof," medical evidence, and the jury's ability to discern false claims. Id.,
214 A.2d at 16 (quoting Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731-32 (N.Y. 1961)). The
court articulated that neither these difficulties nor the danger of false claims should
bar the cause of action, noting that evidence requirements adequately prevent recovery for false claims. Id. at 566-67, 214 A.2d at 16 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the
court discerned that the impact rule's ability to prevent fraudulent claims is negated
by permitting recovery where there has only been slight impact. Id. at 567, 214 A.2d
at 16. Turning to Ward's concern of preventing excessive litigation, Justice Proctor
elucidated that recovery should not be denied in a meritorious action based on fear
of excessive lawsuits, but rather that judicial capacity should be expanded. Id.
66 Id. at 567-68, 214 A.2d at 16. First, Justice Proctor noted that legal scholars have
condemned the rule. Id. & n.3. Second, the justice demonstrated that some of the
cases relied upon in Ward are no longer good law. Id. at 568, 214 A.2d at 16-17 (citing
Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 KB. 669, 676-77 (1901) (repudiating Victorian Rys.
Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888)); Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729,
730 (N.Y. 1961) (overruling Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896)). Finally, the court declared that most jurisdictions no longer require impact as a prerequisite to recovery. Id. at 568-69, 214 A.2d at 17 (citations omitted).
67 Id. at 569, 214 A.2d at 17. The court stipulated, however, that fright without
substantial physical injury would not form a basis for recovery, as it lacks seriousness
and is too speculative. Id. The court also cautioned that an undue delay by the plaintiff in alerting the defendant to the alleged injury is a factor in determining the truthfulness of the claim, and may be included injury instructions. Id. at 569-70, 214 A.2d
at 17.
68 48 N.J. 69, 222 A.2d 513 (1966).
69 Id. at 73, 74, 222 A.2d at 515, 516.
70 Id. at 71-72, 222 A.2d at 514. The plaintiff made the coffee with water drawn
from the kitchen faucet. Id. After seeing the bathroom water, he assumed that he
made the coffee from similarly discolored water, although he did not know this for
sure, not having looked at the water from which he made his coffee. Id. at 72, 222
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the defendants, contending that they sold him a water softener
which they defectively manufactured or installed.7 1
Justice Hall, writing for a unanimous court, first noted that the
scope of Falzone did not extend to injuries resulting from the kind
of fear that the plaintiff experienced.7 2 The justice continued by
explaining that the common tort concepts of duty, proximate
cause, and foreseeability mandate denial of recovery in this case."'
Finding that the injury constituted an extraordinary occurrence,
the court denied recovery, holding that recovery depends upon the
foreseeability of fright so severe that it may be reasonably expected
to cause substantial injury to a normal person.14 Satisfaction of this
standard, the court concluded, would bring the plaintiff within a
"zone of risk."75
In Portee v. Jaffee,7 6 the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized
for the first time a bystander's cause of action for emotional distress induced solely by witnessing the serious physical injury or
death of another." In Portee, the plaintiff's son was dragged by an
A.2d at 514. The plaintiff claimed that his illness resulted solely from his fear of
poisoning, not from the water that he drank. Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 73-74, 222 A.2d at 515. The court stated that this was so without regard to
whether the plaintiffs fear was reasonable. Id. at 74, 222 A.2d at 515.
73 Id. at 74-75, 222 A.2d at 515-16 (quotations omitted). The court observed that
liability for negligence arises from a duty "to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonablerisks," and a breach of that duty.
Id., 222 A.2d at 516 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 30, at 146). Justice Hall
noted that everything is foreseeable and that, consequently, foreseeability becomes a
question of law where policy issues exist. Id. at 75, 222 A.2d at 516 (citing Goldberg v.
Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962)) (other citation omitted). The justice also observed that because everything is foreseeable, the requirement of a duty
must also be met. Id. (citation omitted).
74 Id. at 76, 77, 222 A.2d at 516, 517 (quoting HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15,

§ 18.4, at 1035) (other quotations omitted). The court adopted the view that only
extreme emotional disturbance creates such a substantial risk of harm. Id. at 76-77,
222 A.2d at 517 (quotation and citation omitted).
The court also analyzed the concept of proximate cause. Id. at 77-80, 222 A.2d at
517-19. The court explained that if in hindsight it appears highly extraordinary that a
defendant's conduct resulted in the harm, the conduct was not the proximate cause
of the harm. Id. at 78, 222 A.2d at 518 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 435(2) (1977)). Justice Hall also noted that this determination should be considered a question of law. Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that the plaintiff's injury in this case was a highly extraordinary result of the defendants' conduct
and that their conduct could not, therefore, constitute proximate cause. Id. at 79, 222
A.2d at 518.
75 Id. at 76, 222 A.2d at 517 (quoting HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 18.4, at
1036).
76 84 NJ. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).
77 Id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528; see also Eyrich ex rel. Eyrich v. Dam, 193 NJ. Super.
244, 253, 473 A.2d 539, 544, (App. Div.) (noting that Portee constituted the first case
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elevator after he became trapped between the elevator door and
the shaft. 78 The plaintiff arrived soon afterwards and watched for
hours as the police unsuccessfully attempted to free her child, who
died in the plaintiffs presence while still trapped. 79 The plaintiff
subsequently became depressed, attempted suicide, and underwent counseling for emotional distress.8 0 As a result of the incident, she filed wrongful death, survival, and emotional distress
claims against the building's landlords.8 '
Relying on Falzone, the trial court granted the landlords' summaryjudgment motion as to the emotional distress claim because
no risk of physical harm to the plaintiff existed.8 2 Justice Pashman,
writing for a unanimous court, discerned that Falzone allowed, but
did not expressly require, an "unreasonable risk of physical harm"
to the plaintiff in order to recover for emotional distress.8 " The
justice further posited that the Caputzal "zone of risk" analysis
could be satisfied by the risk of either emotional or physical
harm.8 4 Acknowledging the reasonable foreseeability standard for
determining the existence of a duty,85 the court utilized the guideline approach to develop a test for ascertaining the reasonable forwhere recovery for emotional distress was permitted despite the absence of both actual physical impact and fear of such impact), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 583, 483 A.2d 127
(1984).
78 Portee, 84 N.J. at 91, 417 A.2d at 522.
79 Id., 417 A.2d at 522-23.
80 Id. at 91-92, 417 A.2d at 523.
81 Id. at 92, 417 A.2d at 523. The plaintiff also sought recovery from the elevator's
manufacturer and the company that installed and maintained the elevator, but it was
the landlords who moved for summary judgment. Id.
82 Id. The trial court buttressed its conclusion by noting that Burd v.Vercruyssen
confirmed the view that Falzone "set the outer limits of liability" for negligently inflicted emotional distress. Id. (citing Burd v. Vercruyssen, 142 N.J. Super. 344, 355-56,
361 A.2d 571, 577 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 72 N.J. 459, 371 A.2d 64 (1976)).
83 Id. at 93-94, 417 A.2d at 524 (citation omitted). The justice explained that
courts have, however, narrowly construed Falzone because it constituted a new cause of
action that abolished the impact rule. Id. at 94, 417 A.2d at 524 (footnote omitted).
Therefore, the court continued, the absence of risk of physical harm to the plaintiff
has been a basis for denying recovery. Id. (citing Burd, 142 N.J. Super. 344, 361 A.2d
571; Kern v. Kogan, 93 N.J. Super. 459, 226 A.2d 186 (Law Div. 1967)).
84 See id. at 95, 417 A.2d at 524-25 (stating that "there was no requirement in the
Caputzalformula that the 'zone of risk' of mental or emotional distress coincide with a
zone of risk of physical harm") (emphasis added). Justice Pashman also relied on
relevant NewJersey case law to illustrate that risk of physical harm is unnecessary. Id.,
417 A.2d at 525 (citing Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 433-34, 404 A.2d 8, 14-15 (1979)
(holding that parents may recover for emotional distress resulting from the birth of a
child inflicted with Down's Syndrome, where the doctors negligently failed to inform
the mother of a procedure that would detect fetal defects and give her the option to
abort)).
85 Id. (citation omitted).
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seeability of a plaintiffs emotional harm. 6 The court held that

four elements must be proven before a bystander may recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress: (1) death or serious injury to another as a result of defendant's negligence; (2) a "marital

or intimate, familial relationship" between the bystander and the
victim; (3) observation of the victim's death or injury at the accident scene; and (4) "resulting severe emotional distress."87
Four years later, in Eyrich ex rel. Eyrich v. Dan,8 the New Jersey
Superior Court, Appellate Division, once again confronted the issue of bystander recovery for emotional distress.8 9 In that case, Mr.
and Mrs. Eyrich took their neighbors' child, with whom the couple
had a close relationship, to a circus.9" As the child walked by the
performing area, a circus leopard attacked him.9" Mr. Eyrich attempted to save the child by turning over the leopard's cage and
wrestling with the leopard.9 2 Mr. Eyrich suffered slight injuries,
but finally rescued the bloody child, who later died. 9 Mrs. Eyrich
witnessed the event from her seat.94 Subsequently, Mr. and Mrs.
Eyrich sought recovery for emotional injury that resulted from the
event. 95
Judge Pressler, writing for a unanimous court, proclaimed that
Mr. Eyrich's recovery did not depend on his role as a bystander
because he acted as a rescuer. 96 The judge further characterized
Id. at 98-101, 417 A.2d at 526-28.
Id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528. While discussing Dillon, the court proclaimed that
the close relationship requirement was the most important. Id. at 98, 417 A.2d at 526.
Justice Pashman opined that "[i]t is the presence of deep, intimate, familial ties between the plaintiff and the physically injured person that makes the harm to emotional tranquility so serious and compelling." Id., 417 A.2d at 526-27.
88 193 N.J. Super. 244, 473 A.2d 539 (App. Div.), certif denied, 97 N.J. 583, 483 A.2d
127 (1984).
89 Id. at 252, 473 A.2d at 543.
90 Id. at 24748, 473 A.2d at 541. The Eyrichs' close relationship with the child
began with their exclusive care of him for six months following his birth. Id. at 247,
473 A.2d at 541.
91 Id. at 248-49, 473 A.2d at 541. The child was holding the Eyrichs' daughter's
hand when the leopard jumped on him and dragged him underneath a cage. Id.
92 Id. at 249, 473 A.2d at 541.
93 Id. The court stated that the circus did not have trained personnel on site and,
therefore, a traffic officer had to summon an ambulance to take the child to the
hospital. Id. Mr. Eyrich, the court continued, accompanied the child to the hospital.
Id. The court noted that the doctor's report opined that if medically trained personnel had been on site, the child's life could have been easily saved. Id., 473 A.2d at 54142.
94 See id. at 248, 473 A.2d at 541 (describing the Eyrichs' seating arrangement near
the site of the attack).
95 Id. at 247, 473 A.2d at 540.
96 Id. at 255-56, 473 A.2d at 545. Therefore, the judge stated that the intimate
86
87
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Mrs. Eyrich as a bystander who would not meet the intimate familial relationship element without an extension of Portee.9 7 Acknowledging that the emotional injury to a child's caretaker may be as
foreseeable as the parents' injury, the appellate division neverthe98
less left the task of expanding Portee to the supreme court.
The NewJersey Supreme Court recently determined the scope
of the intimate familial relationship element in Dunphy v. Gregor.
Specifically, the court considered whether unmarried cohabitants
may fall within that scope. 0° The majority first compared and confamilial relationship issue does not arise with respect to the relationship between Mr.
Eyrich and the child. Id. at 255, 473 A.2d at 545. Rather, the appellate division expounded that the reasonable foreseeability of a rescuer's intervention where a negligently created danger arises may render a defendant liable for the rescuer's injuries.
Id. at 256, 473 A.2d at 545 (citations omitted). The court declared that a plaintiff may
recover for all reasonably foreseeable emotional distress caused by the event as a
whole where he is negligently placed in danger of physical risk and sustains impact.
Id. at 256-57, 473 A.2d at 546. In light of Mr. Eyrich's direct involvement in the event,
the court concluded that he had stated a cause of action. Id. at 258-59, 473 A.2d at
546-47.
97 Id. at 259, 473 A.2d at 547. The court observed that although Mrs. Eyrich satisfied two conditions of recovery-"severe emotional distress and observation at the
scene of the accident"-she did not satisfy the third element, which requires an intimate familial relationship. Id.
98 Id.
99 136 NJ. 99, 101, 642 A.2d 372, 373 (1994).
100 Id. The California Supreme Court already confronted and decided this issue in
light of Dillon's"close relationship" element in Elden v. Sheldon. Elden v. Sheldon, 758
P.2d 582, 583 (Cal. 1988). In Elden, the plaintiff and the decedent, who were unmarried cohabitants, were riding in a car together and became involved in an accident
with the defendant. Id. at 582. The decedent was thrown from the vehicle and died
shortly thereafter. Id. The plaintiff sought recovery for the emotional distress inflicted when he witnessed the injury of the decedent, claiming that he and the decedent had a stable and significant relationship similar to a marital relationship. Id. at
582, 582-83. The plaintiff argued that the recent increase of unmarried cohabitant
relationships rendered his injury foreseeable. Id. at 585 (citations omitted).
Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, observed that some cases have permitted
recovery for emotional distress outside of a marriage or blood relationship. Id. at 58485 (citing Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (Haw. 1974) (recognizing a child's
cause of action where he saw his stepfather's mother struck by a car and allegedly
shared a close relationship with her); Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 723, 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (permitting foster mother's recovery
where she witnessed her foster child receive excessive dose of glucose from hospital
personnel, resulting in the child's convulsions and brain damage), disapprovedon other
grounds, Baxter v. Superior Court, 563 P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977); Ledger v. Tippitt, 210
Cal. Rptr. 814, 816, 826 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing recovery where the plaintiff
witnessed the stabbing of her fiance, with whom she cohabitated)). The justice further conceded that there has been an increase in unmarried cohabitation in recent
years, that the strength of emotional bonds in some of these relationships are similar
to those in marriage, that financial resources and expenses may be shared in these
relationships, and that emotional distress due to injury to one of the cohabitants may
be foreseeable. Id. at 585-86 (footnote omitted). The court concluded, however, that
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trasted NewJersey's treatment of emotional distress law with that of
three policy considerations mandate the denial of recovery to unmarried cohabitants.
Id. at 586.
First, the majority posited that the state's interest in the promotion of marriage is
inhibited to the extent that equal rights are granted to both unmarried cohabitants
and married couples. Id. Second, the California Supreme Court proffered that permitting recovery to unmarried cohabitants would impose an undue burden on the
courts and intrude into the privacy of the parties, requiring courts to inquire into the
nature of the relationship to determine whether sufficient emotional attachments existed and whether the relationship was "stable and significant." Id. at 587 (citations
omitted). Third, the court stipulated that there must be some limitation on a defendant's liability. Id. at 587-88 (citation omitted). Justice Mosk elucidated that the need
for limitation on liability is especially urgent where recovery is sought for emotional
damage due to witnessing an injury to another. Id. at 588 (quotation omitted).
Therefore, the justice concluded that the "need to draw a bright line" delineating
where recovery for emotional distress will be denied is essential. Id. The court acknowledged that emotional bonds between unrelated persons may sometimes be as
strong as those between family members, and that emotional distress caused by injury
to one in such a relationship may be just as severe. Id. The majority admonished,
however, that extending recovery to unrelated persons would result in an excessive
extension of a defendant's liability. Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the court
held that an unmarried cohabitant does not state a cause of action for emotional
distress suffered as a result of witnessing injury to the other cohabitant. Id.
The dissent in Elden argued that the policy considerations relied upon by the
majority did not justify denying recovery. Id. at 590 (Broussard, J., dissenting). First,
the dissent proffered that a person would not choose to marry simply to assure standing in a future emotional distress action. Id. at 591 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Justice
Broussard also stated that the presumption that married persons are closely related
would maintain the preferential status of marriage. Id. The justice further articulated
that the law protects the rights of unmarried cohabitants as well as married persons.
Id. at 592 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (citing Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 113 (Cal.
1976) (deciding that an unmarried cohabitant relationship does not necessarily
render agreements between those parties unenforceable)). Second, the dissent elucidated that the burden on the courts would be no greater than in loss of consortium
actions, where inquiry into the nature of the relationship is regularly made. Id. (citations omitted). Justice Broussard continued that the parties can decide for themselves whether the potential recovery is worth the risk of intrusion into their privacy,
and that courts can prevent overly intrusive inquiry. Id. at 593 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Third, the justice criticized arbitrary "bright lines" as a means of limiting liability, proferring that denial of recovery should be based on functional, not definitional,
grounds. Id.
One year following the Elden decision, the California Supreme Court confirmed
the requirement of a marital or blood relationship in Thing v. La Chusa. 771 P.2d
814, 815 (Cal. 1989). In Thing, the plaintiff, after being informed that her child was
hit by a car, went to the scene and found her child lying in the street. Id. The plaintiff alleged that she suffered emotional distress as a result of seeing her child in this
condition. Id. Justice Eagleson, writing for the court, stressed that decisions subsequent to Dillon gave little consideration to the danger of unlimited liability inherent
in a pure foreseeability test. Id. at 821; see infra note 110 (discussing several post-Dillon
cases that have expanded liability). The justice accentuated that foreseeability alone
is not an adequate limitation on liability. Thing, 771 P.2d at 826. The court concluded that a marital or blood relationship is a prerequisite to recovery. Id. at 828,
829. Denying the plaintiffs recovery, the court further concluded that the plaintiffs
presence at the scene of the accident is also required. Id. at 829.
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California. 01' The New Jersey Supreme Court then examined the
common tort concepts of duty and foreseeability and their application to this case.10 2 This analysis led the court to reject California's
view that extending recovery to these circumstances will have adverse effects, therefore concluding that bystander liability may pro03

tect unmarried cohabitants.1
Justice Handler, writing for the majority, began the court's
analysis with a discussion of Portee.10 4 Thejustice noted the emphasis placed by Porteeupon the intimate familial relationship element
of the cause of action. 105 The court further acknowledged the appellate division's conflicting0 6interpretations of Porteewith respect to
the scope of this element.
Next, Justice Handler posited that California's limitation of recovery to married or blood-related persons as expressed in Elden v.
Sheldon 1"7 and Thing v. La Chusal "s resulted from that state's frustration with its own expansion of bystander liability after Dillon. 9
To illustrate this point, the justice surveyed the California cases
that expanded the scope of the Dillon factors. 10 The New Jersey
Supreme Court noted, however, that the close relationship ele101 Dunphy, 136 NJ. at 103-08, 642 A.2d at 374-76.
102 Id. at 108-11, 642 A.2d at 376-77.
103 Id. at 112-115, 642 A.2d at 378-80.
104 Id. at 102-04, 642 A.2d at 373-74. The court observed that the four elements of a
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress enunciated in Portee constituted a standard based on the standard set forth in Dillon. Id. at 103, 642 A.2d at
374; see supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing Dillon).
105 Dunphy, 136 NJ. at 103-04, 642 A.2d at 374 (citation omitted).
106 Id. at 104, 642 A.2d at 374. The appellate division majority interpretation encompassed relationships similar to familial ones and marked by deep emotional
bonds. Id. (citation omitted); see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing
the appellate division's reasoning). Conversely, the dissenting judge sought to limit
the Portee interpretation to marriage or blood relationships. Dunphy, 136 N.J. at 104,
642 A.2d at 374 (citing Dunphy, 261 N.J. Super. at 125, 617 A.2d at 1255 (Muir, JA.D.,
dissenting)); see supra note 49 (discussing the dissent's rationale).
107 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988). See supra note 100 for a discussion of Elden.
108 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). See supra note 100 for a discussion of Thing.
109 Dunphy, 136 N.J. at 105-06, 642 A.2d at 375.
110 Id. at 105, 642 A.2d at 375 (citing Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal.
1985) (holding that the injury or death need not result from a brief and sudden
occurrence to state a cause of action); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813,
817, 819, 820 (Cal. 1980) (allowing recovery based solely on reasonable foreseeability
where the plaintiff is a direct victim rather than a bystander); Krouse v. Graham, 562
P.2d 1022, 1031 (Cal. 1977) (deciding that the contemporaneous observation element does not require actual visual perception of the injury); Nazaroff v. Superior
Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657, 659, 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (expanding the contemporaneous observation element by allowing cause of action where plaintiff did not see her
son drowning but went to the accident scene after hearing the shouts of rescuers)).
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ment has not been expanded."1
Turning to New Jersey's treatment of bystander liability, the
court articulated that the elements of the cause of action have
been applied restrictively." 2 To illustrate that point, the majority
examined those cases refusing to expand the Portee factors.' 1 3 In
view of these cases, Justice Handler concluded that traditional tort
concepts should be utilized to determine whether a duty of care
exists rather than drawing arbitrary lines to distinguish married
from unmarried persons. 1 4
111 Id. at 106, 642 A.2d at 375 (citation omitted). The court observed a commentator's suggestion that only this element was significantly related to foreseeability. Id.
(citing Diamond, supra note 13, at 487-89).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 106-08, 642 A.2d at 375-76. To exemplify that the intimate familial relationship prong has been restrictively applied, the court cited Henderson v. Morristown
Memorial Hosp., 198 NJ. Super. 418, 431, 487 A.2d 742, 749 (App. Div.), certif denied,
101 NJ. 250, 501 A.2d 922 (1985) and Eyrich ex rel. Eyrich v. Damn, 193 NJ. Super. 244,
259, 473 A.2d 539, 547 (App. Div.), certif denied, 97 NJ. 583, 483 A.2d 127 (1984). Id.
at 106-07, 642 A.2d at 375-76. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Eyrich.
In Henderson, the defendant hospital, at the plaintiff's request, conducted a psychological evaluation of the plaintiff's children and recommended that the children
be switched from a Catholic school to a public school. Henderson, 198 N.J. Super at
423, 487 A.2d at 745. Subsequent to the plaintiff's efforts to try to effectuate this
change, the hospital retracted this recommendation. Id. at 424, 487 A.2d at 745. The
plaintiff claimed that the hospital's conduct was negligent and caused him emotional
distress. Id. at 425, 487 A.2d at 746. Denying recovery, the court held that the cause
of action requires emotional injury caused by the death of or serious harm to a close
relative, and refused to extend recovery to these circumstances. Id. at 431, 487 A.2d at
749 (citation omitted).
The Dunphy court also noted that the other prongs of the cause of action have
similarly been narrowly construed. Dunphy, 136 NJ. at 107, 642 A.2d at 376 (citing
Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 62, 622 A.2d 1279, 1288 (1993) (stating that contemporaneous observance of both the medical malpractice and its consequences to the victim
is a prerequisite to a father's recovery for mental distress suffered due to the injury or
demise of a fetus); Frame v. Kothari, 115 NJ. 638, 649, 560 A.2d 675, 681 (1989)
(concluding that a member of an injured victim's family may recover for emotional
distress if he witnesses the medical malpractice, observes its consequences on the victim, and immediately connects the injury to the malpractice); Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., 239 N.J. Super 312, 327-28, 571 A.2d 318, 326 (App. Div. 1990) (observing
that bystander recovery for emotional distress is not allowed unless the bystander was
present and witnessed the actual harm inflicted on a family member), certif. denied,
122 N.J. 188, 584 A.2d 248 (1990); Lindenmuth v. Alperin, 197 N.J. Super. 385, 389,
484 A.2d 1316, 1318 (Law Div. 1984) (concluding that parents of a child who died as
a result of medical malpractice could not recover for emotional distress because the
mental harm resulted from "observing the result rather than an act" and because they
did not experience "sensory perception of a shocking event")); cf. Mercado v. Transport of N.J., 176 N.J. Super. 234, 237, 422 A.2d 800, 801 (Law Div. 1980) (finding that
Portee does not mandate "that a close relative who makes a personal claim for emotional injury witness the accident causing the alleged emotional injury").
114 Dunphy, 136 N.J. at 108, 642 A.2d at 376 (citing People Express Airlines, Inc. v.
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The justice proceeded to apply the concepts of foreseeability
and fairness to the case at bar. 1 5 Conceding the novelty of extending the intimate familial relationship element to unmarried
cohabitants, the court asserted the fairness of such an extension
and the forseeability of such a class.'1 6 Justice Handler further
opined that unlimited liability could be avoided by application of
the other three elements of the tort.1 17 The justice emphasized the
foreseeability of emotional injury to an unmarried cohabitant due
to society's increased approval of unmarried cohabitation." 8 Rejecting the notion that the extension would unduly burden defendants, the majority stipulated that the scope of the duty, as well as its
existence, depends upon foreseeability.1 9
Continuing, the court elucidated that the core of a bystander
liability claim rests in the emotional bonds surrounding the relationship. 12 0 Justice Handler insisted that in order for a plaintiff to
Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 NJ. 246, 254, 495 A.2d 107, 111 (1985) ("The answer to
the allegation of unchecked liability is not the judicial obstruction of a fairly
grounded claim for redress. Rather, it must be a more sedulous application of traditional concepts of duty and proximate causation to the facts of each case.")).
115 Id. at 108-11, 642 A.2d at 376-77. Justice Handler stated that the existence of a
duty is determined by analyzing the foreseeability and severity of the risk and the
public policy ramifications that would flow from such a duty. Id. at 108, 642 A.2d at
376 (citing Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 NJ. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962)
(stating that the existence of a duty "is ultimately a question of fairness," and that
"[t] he inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the
risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution")). The justice added that fairness ultimately determines the existence of a duty. Id. (citation omitted). The court
further observed its own recognition of duties in novel and controversial areas. Id. at
109, 642 A.2d at 376-77 (citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 NJ. 426, 448, 625
A.2d 1110, 1120 (1993) (imposing a duty of care upon a real estate broker to make
reasonable inspection of the premises and to warn of defects to protect the safety of
prospective purchasers and visitors who participate in an open-house tour of the
premises); Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 492, 524 A.2d 366, 378 (1987) (abrogating the immunity of a water company for losses which result from the company's
negligent failure to maintain sufficient water pressure to fight fires); Kelly v. Gwinnell,
96 NJ. 538, 548, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1984) (holding a social host liable for injuries
caused by the negligent driving of an intoxicated guest if the host serves liquor to the
guest with knowledge of the guest's intoxication and the fact that he will be driving))
(other citation omitted).
116 Id., 642 A.2d at 377.
117 Id. (citations omitted).
118 Id. at 109-10, 642 A.2d at 377 (citations omitted). The court cited approvingly
to the appellate division's view of the necessity to distinguish between ordinary emotional harm in general and "indelibly stunning" harm experienced by one in an intimate relationship with the victim. Id. (quoting Dunphy, 261 N.J. Super. at 123, 617
A.2d at 1255).
119 Id. at 110, 642 A.2d at 377 (citation omitted). The court added that the goals of
tort law are advanced and liability is sufficiently limited by allowing recovery in this
case. Id. at 110, 642 A.2d at 377 (citation omitted).
120 Id. at 111, 642 A.2d at 377.
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recover for emotional distress, the emotional security provided by
the relationship must be destroyed by the severe harm that caused
the distress.'
The justice expounded that the severity of the loss
122
will be measured by the quality of the cohabitants' relationship.
The majority opined that the courts and juries are fully capable of
assessing the genuineness of claims.1 2 3 The court discerned that
the determination of damages in cases involving loss of consortium
requires similar inquiry into the quality of the relationship.124 Accordingly, the court concluded that the task of evaluating the
strength of a relationship belongs to the jury. 12 5 The majority also
developed a6 standard to guide the jury in making that
2
assessment. 1

Lastly, Justice Handler addressed California's concerns regarding the potential adverse effects of extending liability.127 First, the
justice rebutted the concern that expansion would result in fictitious claims by noting the superior interest in recognizing meritorious claims.
Second, the majority responded to the California
courts' concern that expansion would result in excessive intrusion
Id.
Id., 642 A.2d at 377-78 (quotation omitted).
Id., 642 A.2d at 378 (quoting Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 135, 447 A.2d 173,
177-78 (1982) ("To achieve substantial justice in other cases, we have adjusted the
rights and duties of parties in light of the realities of their relationship.")) (other
citation omitted).
124 Id. (citing Bendar v. Rosen, 247 NJ. Super. 219, 228, 588 A.2d 1264, 1268 (App.
Div. 1991) (stating that plaintiff testified as to the change in his relationship with his
wife following her abortion) and Carr v. Carr, 120 N.J. 336, 352, 576 A.2d 872, 880
(1990) (observing that principles of quasi-contract may be invoked by unmarried cohabitants who obtain rights "as a result of enduring, intimate personal relationships
founded on mutual trust, dependence, and raised expectations")).
125 Id. at 111, 111-12, 642 A.2d at 378 (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 261 NJ. Super.
110, 122, 617 A.2d 1248, 1254 (App. Div. 1992)).
126 Id. at 112, 642 A.2d at 378. The court declared:
That standard must take into account the duration of the relationship,
the degree of mutual dependence, the extent of common contributions
to a life together, the extent and quality of shared experience, and, as
expressed by the Appellate Division, "whether the plaintiff and the injured person were members of the same household, their emotional
reliance on each other, the particulars of their day to day relationship,
and the manner in which they related to each other in attending to
life's mundane requirements."
Id. (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 261 N.J. Super. 110, 123, 617 A.2d 1248, 1255 (App.
Div. 1992)).
127 Id. at 112-15, 642 A.2d at 378-80.
128 Id. at 112, 642 A.2d at 378 (quoting Pieters v. B-Right Trucking, Inc., 669 F.
Supp. 1463, 1471 (N.D. Ind. 1987)). The court emphasized the injustice inherent in
denying recovery based upon the label a relationship bears where the emotional
harm is real and the relationship is intimate. Id. (quotation omitted).
121

122
123
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into the private life of the parties, asserting that the same assessment of the relationship occurs whether the parties are married or
not. 129 Third, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the notion
that the state's interest in the promotion of marriage would be inhibited by extending recovery to unmarried cohabitants.130 Finally, the justice rejected the notion that extending recovery to
these circumstances excessively expands tort liability.' 3 ' The majority recognized that some jurisdictions require a blood relationship as a prerequisite to recovery. 1 32 13The
court stressed, however,
3
not.
do
jurisdictions
other
many
that
Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court extended the
scope of recovery based on bystander liability to unmarried cohabitants.13 1 Specifically, the court held that unmarried cohabitants
may satisfy the intimate familial relationship element of negligent
Id. at 113, 642 A.2d at 378-79 (citations omitted).
Id. at 113, 642 A.2d at 379. The court agreed with Justice Broussard's dissent in
Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 591 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting), in which
the justice stated that people would not marry just to assure standing in a potential
future emotional distress action and that the law and society will still prefer marriage.
Id. (citation omitted); see supra note 100 (discussing Justice Broussard's dissent). Additionally, the court refused to accept the defendant's argument that the price of car
insurance would increase as a result of allowing recovery for unmarried cohabitants.
Dunphy, 136 N.J. at 114, 642 A.2d at 379 (citation omitted). Justice Handler expounded that such a concern is outweighed by the emotional harm suffered. Id. (citation omitted).
'3' Dunphy, 136 N.J. at 114, 642 A.2d at 379.
132 Id. at 114-15, 642 A.2d at 379 (citing Sollars v. City of Albuquerque, 794 F. Supp.
360, 363 (D.N.M. 1992) (declining to extend bystander recovery beyond the immediate family of the victim); Ferretti v. Weber, 513 So. 2d 1333, 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
(holding that a plaintiff could not recover for emotional distress that resulted from
witnessing the death of a cohabitant because "[t]here was no marriage and therefore
no legal relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased"), cause dismissed, 519 So.
2d 986 (Fla. 1987); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981) (stating that an
element of a bystander's emotional distress claim is that "[t]he bystander and the
victim were husband and wife or related within the second degree of consanguinity or
affinity"); Trombetta v. Conkling, 593 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (App. Div. 1993) (declining
to adopt a rule that would permit plaintiffs to establish the nature of their relationship with the victim)) (other citation omitted).
133 Id. at 115, 642 A.2d at 379-80 (citing Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (Haw.
1974) (stating that lack of a blood relationship between the plaintiff and victim
should not foreclose recovery);James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 115 (Neb. 1985) (concluding that a "marital or intimate familial relationship" is required rather than a
specific degree of consanguinity); Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766-67 (Ohio
1983) (stating that "a strict blood relationship between the accident victim and the
plaintiff-bystander is not necessarily required" and that "a plaintiff who is affianced
with the victim could very well be described as a close relation"); Heldreth v. Marrs,
425 S.E.2d 157, 162-63 (W. Va. 1992) (agreeing with courts that have adopted a requirement that a plaintiff have a marital or intimate familial relationship with the
victim rather than a blood relationship)) (other citations omitted).
134 Id., 642 A.2d at 380.
129
130
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infliction of emotional distress where they have a stable, enduring,
substantial relationship with strong emotional bonds and deep
emotional security."3 5 The majority recognized an interest in the
emotional tranquility provided by such a relationship.1 3 6
Justice Garibaldi authored a vociferous dissent.'13 The justice
attacked the majority's standard as failing to protect against unlimited liability.'3 8 The dissent posited that although the quality of an
unmarried cohabitant's relationship and the emotional harm suffered may be equivalent to that of married persons, this is often the
case with close friends as well.13 9 Justice Garibaldi offered Portee as
an example that emotional ties and the potential for emotional
harm should not be dispositive.14 The justice observed that Portee
requires a parent to witness the injury-causing event to recover,
although she would have suffered emotional harm had she only
heard about the event."' The dissent further noted that California
has declined to extend bystander liability to unmarried cohabitants.' 42 Justice Garibaldi proferred that no public policy justification exists for the increase in claims that will result from the
majority's decision.' 4 3 Furthermore, the justice noted that confusion will ensue in other areas of the law where unmarried cohabitants are not treated the same as spouses. 4
The justice proceeded to address the issue of arbitrary linedrawing.145 The dissent accentuated the need for clear delineation
Id.
Id.
137 See id. at 115-23, 642 A.2d at 380-84 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 115-16, 642 A.2d at 380 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). The justice conceded,
however, that unmarried cohabitants may experience emotional harm as severe as
married couples would suffer upon witnessing the death of a partner. Id. at 116, 642
A.2d at 380 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
139 Id. (citation omitted).
140 Id. The justice noted that the Porteecourt understood the need to limit the class
of plaintiffs able to recover in an action for emotional distress. Id.
141 Id. Accordingly, the dissent explained that a four-factor test was developed to
aid courts in determining when recovery is warranted. Id.
142 Id. at 116-17, 642 A.2d at 380 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting) (citing Elden v. Sheldon,
758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988)) (quotation omitted). The dissent compared California's
expansive interpretation of the guideline approach to liability with New Jersey's restrictive interpretation. Id. The dissent stated that New Jersey should continue to
adhere to that narrow interpretation. Id. at 117, 642 A.2d at 381 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 117-19, 642 A.2d at 381-82 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). The justice observed
that fairness dictates where the line is drawn. Id. at 117, 642 A.2d at 381 (Garibaldi,J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). The dissent further noted that the factors to be considered include the weighing of the parties' relationship, the foreseeability and sever135
136
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146
of the scope of liability and those included in the plaintiff class.
Justice Garibaldi opined that a rule performing this function
should be applied more rigorously in emotional distress actions because of the difficulty in defining emotional injuries and because
of a potentially unlimited plaintiff class. 14 7 Conceding that denial
of recovery to unmarried cohabitants also constitutes arbitrary linedrawing, the justice elucidated the necessity of arbitrariness to set
the outer limits of liability.1 48 Justice Garibaldi discerned that
nearly every case will involve someone who arguably should not be
excluded, regardless of where the line is drawn.1 49 Therefore, the
justice advocated a rule that would limit recovery to those in a marital or blood relationship with the victim. 15 °
The dissent next confronted the public policy justifications for
denying recovery to unmarried cohabitants. 15 1 Justice Garibaldi acknowledged that society expects that married couples will be
treated differently than unmarried cohabitants. 15 2 Thejustice illustrated this point by noting that an unmarried cohabitant may not

ity of the risk, and the interest of the public in a proposed solution. Id. (citation
omitted).
146

Id.

Id. at 117-18, 642 A.2d at 381 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Id. at 118, 642 A.2d at 381 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). To illustrate this point, the
dissent reiterated the arbitrariness of requiring the plaintiff to witness the injury-causing event. Id. Justice Garibaldi emphasized that a mother who is informed that an
auto accident killed her child or who arrives after the accident would suffer the same
emotional distress as if she witnessed the event. Id. The justice continued that most
people suffer emotional distress in their lives without negligence, such as when a
loved one dies, and that therefore most emotional distress is not redressed. Id. at 11819, 642 A.2d 381 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
149 Id. at 119, 642 A.2d at 381-82 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
150 Id., 642 A.2d at 382 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent posited that the language "marital or intimate familial relationship" supports this position. Id. (citation
omitted). Furthermore, Justice Garibaldi continued, this interpretation is buttressed
by cases that have interpreted the element as including only "close relatives or immediate family members." Id. (citing Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., 239 NJ. Super.
312, 327, 571 A.2d 318, 326 (App. Div.) (stating that bystander recovery for mental
distress is limited to a bystander who was present and witnessed the actual harm to a
family member), certif denied, 122 N.J. 188, 584 A.2d 248 (1990); Henderson v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 198 N.J. Super 418, 431, 487 A.2d 742, 749 (App. Div.) (noting
that Portee v. Jaffee was intended to permit recovery for emotional distress where the
distress results from the death of or severe physical harm to a close relative); certif.
denied, 101 N.J. 250, 501 A.2d 922 (1985); Eyrich ex rel. Eyrich v. Dam, 193 N.J. Super.
244, 259, 473 A.2d 539, 547 (App. Div.) (concluding that a temporary caretaker of a
child did not have sufficient intimate family ties with the child to allow recovery for
emotional distress upon witnessing an attack on the child by a circus leopard), certif.
denied, 97 N.J. 583, 483 A.2d 127 (1984)).
151 Id. at 120-21, 642 A.2d at 382-83 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 120, 642 A.2d at 382 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The justice articulated
that this is evidenced by the abolition of common-law marriage and the legislature's
147
148
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inherit by intestacy, 15 3 recover for wrongful death, 154 collect alimony,' 55 require support from the other cohabitant absent an
agreement, 5 6 or recover for loss of consortium. 5 7
Finally, the dissent pronounced that the majority's decision
subsequent failure to reauthorize it. Id. (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-10 (West
1968)). Section 37:1-10 provides in pertinent part:
[N]o marriage contracted on and after December first, nineteen hundred and thirty-nine, shall be valid unless the contracting parties shall
have obtained a marriage license as required by section 37:1-2 of this
Title, and unless, also, the marriage, after license duly issued therefor,
shall have been performed by or before any person, religious society,
institution or organization authorized by section 37:1-13 of this Title to
solemnize marriages; and failure in any case to comply with both prerequisites aforesaid, which shall always be construed as mandatory and
not merely directory, shall render the purported marriage absolutely
void.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-10 (West 1968).
The justice added that this abolition is based on the rationale that common-law
marriage avoids legal commitment and that the couple may not engage in such procedures as filing joint income tax returns and using the same surname. Dunphy, 136 N.J.
at 120, 642 A.2d at 382 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Therefore, the
dissent concluded, unmarried cohabitants are still treated differently than married
persons with respect to workers' compensation benefits and insurance policy benefits.
Id.
153 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-3 (West 1983) (stating the intestate share of a
surviving spouse, but making no mention of an unmarried cohabitant); Newburgh v.
Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 541, 443 A.2d 1031, 1036 (1982) (concluding that a wife-in-fact of
a decedent is not an heir of the decedent)).
154 Id. at 120-21, 642 A.2d at 382-83 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:31-4 (West 1987) (limiting recovery for wrongful death to those entitled to
inherit by intestacy); Sykes v. Propane Power Corp, 224 NJ. Super. 686, 697, 541 A.2d
271, 276-77 (App. Div. 1988) (concluding that an unmarried cohabitant's claim for
wrongful death is barred because the right of recovery for wrongful death derives
from the intestacy statute, which applies only to "surviving spouses"); Cassano v. Durham, 180 NJ. Super. 620, 626, 436 A.2d 118, 121 (Law Div. 1981) (holding that an
unmarried cohabitant is not a "surviving spouse" under the intestacy laws and therefore cannot recover under the Wrongful Death Act, which applies only for the benefit
of those entitled to inherit by intestacy)).
155 Id. at 121, 642 A.2d at 383 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Crowe v. De Gioia,
90 N.J. 126, 132, 447 A.2d 173, 176 (1982) (noting that "alimony may be awarded only
in a matrimonial action for divorce or nullity" and that a "matrimonial action" does
not include a contractual action between unmarried cohabitants)); see N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:34-23 (West 1987) ("Pending any matrimonial action .. . the court may make
such order as to the alimony or maintenance of the parties ... as the circumstances of
the parties .

.

. shall render fit, reasonable and just . .

").

Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:1-140(a) (West 1987) and Kozlowski v. Kozlowski,
80 N.J. 378, 387, 403 A.2d 902, 907-08 (1979) (stating that although the court was
recognizing that contracts between unmarried cohabitants are enforceable, it was not
reviving common law marriage)).
157 Id. (citing Leonardis v. Morton Chem. Co., 184 N.J. Super. 10, 11, 445 A.2d 45,
45-46 (App. Div. 1982) ("The right of recovery for loss of consortium... is founded
upon the marriage relation. Absent such relationship, the right does not exist, and
thus no recovery may be had for loss thereof."). The dissent proferred that limitation
156
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will result in adverse consequences. 5 s Chastising as unworkable
the majority's standard for determining the intimate familial relationship element, Justice Garibaldi warned that the vast number of
cohabitants in today's society will cause a sharp increase in the
number of bystander claims.' 5 9 Thejustice further warned that the
private lives of the parties will be invaded 160 and that speculation
regarding their relationship will arise.' 61 Furthermore, the dissent
continued, burdensome and expensive investigations will be required to alleviate the disadvantage that the defendant will suffer
where only one cohabitant survives to discuss the relationship.' 6 2
that it is not the task of the courts
Justice Garibaldi further stressed
163
relationships.
evaluate
to
The New Jersey Supreme Court should be applauded for its
recognition of an unmarried cohabitant's interest in emotional
tranquility. Unmarried cohabitation has become an increasingly
popular living arrangement over the past several decades. 6 4 The
Dunphy decision should not be so narrowly construed as to merely
determine the scope of the "intimate, familial relationship" element of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Rather, the deciof liability is the most persuasive policy reason for denying unmarried cohabitants'
recovery for loss of consortium. Id. (citation omitted).
158 Id. at 122-23, 642 A.2d at 383-84 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 122, 642 A.2d at 383 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
160 Id. The dissent predicted probing inquiry into the parties' sexual fidelity, commitment to each other, economic interdependence, and estate plans. Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 123, 642 A.2d at 384 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Childers v. Shannon, 183 NJ. Super. 591, 595, 444 A.2d 1141, 1142-43 (Law Div. 1982) (stating that it
is not the court's function "to sift through the myriad relationships of a party in a
negligence action to determine which of those near and dear have suffered an injury
proximately caused by tortious conduct")).
164 See Jan L. Bernstein et al., Moving On After Moving In: The Case for Including
UnmarriedPartners in New Jersey Family Law, NJ. LAw., Nov./Dec. 1993, at 30 (observing that a 1990 New Jersey census revealed that 95,387 unmarried cohabitant households exist in NewJersey, an amount equal to 3.41 percent of total households in the
state); Tammy L. Lewis, Comment, Standing in the Shadows: Honoring the Contractual
Obligations of Cohabitantsfor Support, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 171, 171 (1991) (noting the increase in the number of couples who have chosen unmarried cohabitation
over marriage); Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and
Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of "Family",29 J. FAM. L. 497, 497 (1991)
(observing the decrease in nuclear families in American households today and the
increase in "alternative family" arrangements); Jennifer Jaff, Essay, Wedding Bell Blues:
The Positionof UnmarriedPeople in American Law, 30 ARiz. L. REv. 207, 227 (1988) ("[I]t
is well established that the attitudes and actions of both law and society have changed
drastically with respect to the moral character of cohabitation and marriage. Marriage no longer has the moral significance it once did. Neither is it the necessary
foundation for the family.") (footnote omitted).
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sion should be recognized as a continuance of a trend generally
expanding the rights of unmarried cohabitants in New Jersey.
Several recent developments in New Jersey indicate a propensity toward increasing legal protection of unmarried cohabitants.
First, the NewJersey Legislature repealed the statute making fornication a crime. 16 5 Second, case law has recognized the enforceability of contracts between cohabitants. 166 Third, the Legislature, by
enacting the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, has included unmarried cohabitants among those persons to be protected from domestic violence. 6 7 Fourth, the NewJersey Supreme
Court amended the New Jersey Court Rules to give the Family Part
of the Chancery Division jurisdiction over civil claims brought by
those in a family or family-like relationship, including unmarried
165 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:110-1 (West 1985) (repealed 1979); see also State v. Saunders, 75 NJ. 200, 220, 381 A.2d 333, 342 (1977) (holding fornication statute unconstitutional). The fornication statute sought to prohibit "all sexual relations between
men and unmarried women," without regard to the underlying circumstances. Id. at
209, 381 A.2d at 337 (footnote omitted). The Saunders court expounded that the
conduct prohibited by the statute involved a fundamental personal choice within the
right of privacy. Id. at 213-14, 381 A.2d at 339. The court found that the state's interest in preventing venereal disease would not be met by the statute because people
would not be deterred from having sex, and that the statute was an impermissible
means of protecting marriage and public morals. Id. at 217-19, 381 A.2d at 341-42.
The court concluded that "[t] he right of personal autonomy is fundamental to a free
society" and that consenting adults cannot be coerced by the state into abstaining
from fornication. Id. at 220, 381 A.2d at 342.
166 See Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 385, 386, 403 A.2d 902, 906, 907 (1979)
(holding that agreements between unmarried cohabitants fail only to the extent that
sexual services form the consideration, and stating that cohabitation is not condemned by New Jersey's public policy).
167 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17 to -33 (West 1995). The Legislature describes a "victim of domestic violence" as "any person who is 18 years of age or older or who is an
emancipated minor and who has been subjected to domestic violence by a spouse,
former spouse, or any otherperson who is a present orformer household member." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-19(d) (emphasis added).
The Legislature's efforts in this area have been buttressed by the courts. See, e.g.,
Bryant v. Burnett, 264 N.J. Super. 222, 226, 624 A.2d 584, 586 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that plaintiff who cohabited with defendant for three months had standing to
bring complaint under the Act even though the living arrangement was only temporary and not intended to be permanent); Croswell v. Shenouda, 275 N.J. Super 614,
625, 646 A.2d 1140, 1146 (Ch. Div. 1994) (holding that plaintiff could not bring complaint where there was no cohabitation between the plaintiff and defendant, stating
that "some indicia of sharing a home together" is required); Torres v. Lancellotti, 257
N.J. Super. 126, 128, 131-32, 607 A.2d 1375, 1376, 1378 (Ch. Div. 1992) (refusing to
set aside plaintiffs restraining order against her former live-in boyfriend of eight
years, despite the fact that they had sex after order was issued); Desiato v. Abbott, 261
N.J. Super. 30, 34, 617 A.2d 678, 680 (Ch. Div. 1992) (holding that a "household
member" means more than casual dating, but less than residing together, noting that
overnight stays and constancy of the relationship are among factors to be
considered).
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Fifth, several cases have impliedly recognized the
cohabitants."
potential security and stability of a cohabitation relationship by
holding that cohabitation by a divorced spouse may constitute
changed circumstances justifying modification of alimony payments. 16 9 Although the dissent in Dunphy argued that society ex170
pects cohabitants to be treated differently than married couples,
Justice Garibaldi failed to take notice of this trend toward expansion of cohabitants' rights and society's increased acceptance of cohabitation as an alternative family arrangement.
The dissent's other concerns also do not justify denial of recovery to cohabitants. The fact that the number of bystander
claims may increase has already been dispensed by the legal com1 1
munity as an insufficient ground for denying recovery. 7
Although the threat of unlimited liability remains a valid concern
168 See N.J. CT. R. 5:1-2; see also Crowe v. De Gioia, 102 N.J. 50, 52-53, 505 A.2d 591,
592 (1986) (discussing the applicable New Jersey rule). Specifically, R. 5:1-2(a) provides that "[a] 11civil actions in which the principal claim is unique to and arises out of
a family orfamily-ktype relationshipshall be brought in the Family Part." N.J. CT. R. 5:12(a) (emphasis added). The comment to this rule states:
It is the apparent intent of the Rule to include within this category of
undefined family actions support and property claims among persons
who constitute their relationship in a manner comparable to marriage
but who are not married to each other. Presumably this category will
include unmarried cohabitingadults whether or not of the same sex and children who are part of their households.
PRESSLER, CuRRENT N.J. COURT RuLEs, Comment R. 5:1-2 (emphasis added).
169 See, e.g., Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 153-54, 154-55, 456 A.2d 102, 104, 105
(1983) (holding that cohabitation by a divorced spouse constitutes changed circumstances justifying modification of alimony where the divorced spouse's cohabiting
partner either contributes to the support of the divorced spouse or lives in the divorced spouse's home while failing to contribute toward household expenses); Calcaterra v. Calcaterra, 206 N.J. Super. 398, 404, 502 A.2d 1180, 1183 (App. Div. 1986)
(concluding that reduction of alimony payments as a result of a divorced spouse's
receipt of support from a cohabitant shall apply retroactively to the entire period of
cohabitation during which the divorced spouse received such support); Garlinger v.
Garlinger, 137 N.J. Super. 56, 63, 347 A.2d 799, 803 (App. Div. 1975) (concluding
that a divorced spouse's unchastity subsequent to a divorce is not alone ajustification
for modifying alimony, but is a factor to be considered to the extent that it bears on
the divorced spouse's need for alimony); Grossman v. Grossman, 128 N.J. Super. 193,
197, 319 A.2d 508, 510 (Ch. Div. 1974) (deciding that a former husband was entitled
to a rebuttable presumption that his former wife's cohabiting partner contributed
toward household expenses and therefore reduced the former wife's needs for
alimony).
170 Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 120, 642 A.2d 372, 382 (1995) (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting). The dissent pointed to those areas of the law which constrict the rights of
unmarried cohabitants. Id. at 120-22, 642 A.2d 382-83 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text (discussing those areas of New Jersey law
where unmarried cohabitants have no cause of action).
171 See supra note 10 (noting that the fear of excessive litigation has become viewed
as an insufficient basis for denying recovery).
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when assessing bystander liability claims, a7 2 sufficient safeguards
exist to limit those plaintiffs who may recover. Specifically, it must
be remembered that the majority's conclusion in Dunphy does not
allow recovery to every cohabitant or other bystander who suffers
emotional distress from witnessing the injury of a victim with whom
the bystander had a close relationship. Rather, the bystander must
convince a jury that he or she satisfies the rigorous fact-specific
standard relating to the quality of the relationship. 17 The reliance
upon the jury to weed out those claims that do not satisfy the standard is clearly recognized by the judicial system. 1 74 Furthermore,
even if the intimate familial relationship element is satisfied, the
bystander must also satisfy the other three prongs of the test
adopted in Portee v. Jaffee.1 75 The extensive inquiry and investigation required by the newly-promulgated standard are realities of
litigation and do not justify denying recovery to a deserving
plaintiff.
NewJersey is recognized in the legal community as a producer
of revolutionary opinions. 176 The New Jersey Supreme Court has
once again reinforced this reputation in Dunphy v. Gregor.1 77 In
78
light of the increase in the numbers of unmarried cohabitants,
the New Jersey courts should determine the rights of cohabitants
by focusing on the family-like nature of the relationship. If a cohabitation relationship is as stable, substantial, and family-like as a
marital relationship, the courts should grant similar remedies as
are available to married persons. This most recent expansion of
unmarried cohabitants' rights comports with the trend which has
developed in New Jersey. Both the courts and the Legislature
should begin to redefine the term "family" in statutes and case law
172 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (stating that unlimited liability remains
a concern that requires some limitation on mental distress actions).
173 See supra note 126 (setting forth the standard adopted by the court).
174 See, e.g., Doe v. Cuomo, 649 A.2d 266, 274 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) (stating that
false claims may be avoided by admonishing the jury to carefully evaluate such
claims); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519-20 (Haw. 1970) (declaring that the
genuineness of mental distress claims may be determined by juries based on the
proofs offered, and that such determinations rely in part on the jury's ability to discover and dismiss dishonest claims) (citation omitted); Batalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d
729, 731-32 (N.Y. 1961) (same).
175 84 N.J. 88, 101, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (1980); see supra note 87 and accompanying
text (discussing the test adopted in Portee).
176 Kerrie Restieri-Heslin, Note, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 2227, 2255 n.121 (1994)
(citations omitted).
177 136 N.J. 99, 642 A.2d 372 (1994).
178 See supra note 164 and accompanying text (setting forth commentators who
have noted the proliferation of unmarried cohabitation).
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to include unmarried cohabitants not only in tort law, but in the
legal structure as a whole. The Dunphy decision is the most recent
example of New Jersey's willingness to undertake such a
redefinition.
Anthony Fernandez

